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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AARON L. HELBACH, 
Appellant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent. 
Case No. 20080951-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief 
challenging his conviction for aggravated robbery. This Court has jurisdiction of 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to 
demonstrate that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary? 
2. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to 
demonstrate that the trial court should have sua sponte ordered a competency 
examination before accepting the guilty plea? 
3. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to 
establish that his trial attorney was ineffective for not requesting a competency 
examination? 
4. Did the post-conviction court correctly conclude that Helbach failed to 
establish that his trial attorney was ineffective for not challenging the admissibility 
of Helbach's confession? 
Standard of Review. A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the 
burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts 
necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. This Court reviews the post-conviction 
court's legal conclusions for correctness and its factual findings for clear error., 
Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 950 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted). 
5. Did the post-conviction court err in not sua sponte ordering an evidentiary 
hearing on Helbach's claims? 
Standard of Review. Unpreserved claims are evaluated for plain error. See 
State v. Richardson, 2009 UT App 40, Ifl 7-8, 204 P.3d 872 (claim that trial court 
should have ordered evidentiary hearing reviewed for plain error where defendant 
failed to request a hearing). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are attached as Addendum A: 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-302 (West 2004); 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-15-5 (West Supp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 21, 2003, Helbach was charged in Second District Court, Weber 
County, with three counts of aggravated robbery in three separate informations. R. 
383-84 ("Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Dismissing Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief/' dated September 26, 2009, Addendum B). In case no. 
031901411, it was alleged that Helbach, claiming to have a gun, robbed an Arby's 
restaurant on February 14, 2003. R. 384. In case no. 031901412, it was alleged that 
Helbach, claiming to have a knife, robbed a Sinclair station on March 11,2003. Id. 
Helbach was also charged in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County 
with two armed robberies of convenience stores that occurred on February 13,2003. 
See docket for case no. 031700453. Id. 
Helbach ultimately pleaded guilty to a total of three counts of aggravated 
robbery. On April 7, 2003, Helbach pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated 
robbery in the Davis County case and the other count of aggravated robbery in that 
case was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. On August 18, 2003, Helbach 
pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery in the Weber County cases. See 
3 
Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel ("Plea 
Statement"), R. 44-49, Addendum C. In exchange for Helbach's guilty pleas to in the 
Weber County cases (case nos. 031901411 and 031901412), the State agreed to 
dismiss the third count (case no. 031901413) and to recommend that any prison term 
be imposed concurrently with any term imposed in the Davis County case.1 
In the Plea Statement in the Weber County cases, which are the subject of thus 
appeal, Helbach acknowledges the elements of the crimes to which he pleaded 
guilty: "I unlawfully and intentionally took or attempted to take personal property 
from another by the threatened use of a gun." R. 45. He also stated: 
I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my 
conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to 
accept my guilty plea and prove the elements of the crime(s) to 
which I am pleading guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I 
attempted to take property from (1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon 
by use of a gun (1) and a knife (2). 
Id. 
He acknowledged that his guilty plea waives all of the constitutional rights to 
which he would otherwise be entitled, including the presumption of innocence, the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the rights to a jury trial, to confront and 
The charges and guilty pleas are summarized in a Department of Corrections 
Field Operations memorandum, dated August 27, 2003, R. 59-60, and in the Pre-
sentence Investigative Report ("PSIR"), dated May 14, 20004, R. 61-70. 
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cross-examine witnesses and to appeal. R. 46. The Plea Statement advised Helbach 
that he could receive a prison sentence of five years to life. R. 38. 
Helbach stated: 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, 
threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to 
plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement 
have been made to me . . . I have read this statement, or I have had it 
read to me by an attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt 
each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or 
delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make 
any changes because all of the statements are correct. 
R. 41-42. 
Helbach affirmed that he was mentally stable and able to comprehend the 
plea agreement: 
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I 
am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or 
intoxicants which impair my judgment. I believe myself to be of sound 
and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of understanding 
these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any 
mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from 
understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
R.42. 
Finally, Helbach acknowledged that he understood that if he wished to 
withdraw his plea, he could do so only by motion filed before sentencing and only 
upon a showing of good cause. Id. 
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During the August 18, 2003, change-of-plea hearing in the Weber County 
cases, the contents of the Plea Statement were properly incorporated into the record 
through a colloquy with the trial court: 
THE COURT: All right. Is there a written plea agreement? 
MR. CAINE [defendant's counsel]: There is. 
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there, Mr. Helbach? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do. 
THE COURT: What's you level of education? 
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school. 
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you have 
any mental health condition today that would make it so you don'i fully 
understanding what's happening? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the legal representation 
you've received? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If you wish, you may go ahead and sign that. 
MR. CAINE: Actually, he signed it earlier, I can affirm. We'll just 
make a record, Your Honor. Aaron, you and reviewed this document 
and talked about this and it bears your signature and you just signed it 
in the lockup in there a minute ago; is that correct? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That is your signature? And do you waive or give up 
your preliminary hearing rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand you've had the right to have 
preliminary hearings? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
R. 301-03 (Transcript, change-of-plea hearing, dated August 18, 2003) (emphasis 
added), Addendum D. 
On September 8, 2003, Helbach was sentenced to two terms of five years to 
life at the Utah State Prison. The court reluctantly followed the State's 
recommendation and agreed to impose concurrent sentences for the two crimes: 
THE COURT: Well, again, I struggle. You had four felonies as a 
juvenile, and then you have the Davis County felony, and this makes 
six felonies, and many of them [are] very, very serious felonies. I 
suppose I can just place my trust in the Board of Pardons and hope 
that they do what is right. And I suspect they're going to have an 
opportunity to observe you and your conduct while you're at the 
prison. So I'm going to go along with it I have a great deal of 
reluctance because these are very serious charges. 
R. 317 (Transcript, sentencing hearing, dated September 8, 2003), Addendum E. 
Helbach filed no timely appeal. 
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On March 5, 2004, Helbach filed a pleading in the Weber County criminal 
cases captioned "Motion to be Re-Sentenced Nunc Pro Tunc" in which he claimed 
inter alia that his plea was improperly and involuntarily entered due to mental 
illness. In denying the motion, the trial court stated that: 
Rule 11 governing pleas has been substantially complied with by the 
Court and that Defendant was advised by this Court that if he had any 
mental illness that affected his ability to understand[,] he should not go 
ahead[,] and he stated that he understood that. Numerous other 
questions were posed to Defendant which he answered in a manner 
that indicated he fully understood what he was doing. 
R. 321-22. 
On August 9, 2004, Helbach filed a "Notice of Appeal." On November 2'., 
2004, this Court dismissed the appeal. See State v. Helbach, 2004 UT APP 388U 
(Memorandum Decision) ("Helbach I"), cert, denied, 109 P.3d 804 (2005), Addendum 
F.2 The court noted that Helbach's motion to be resentenced was "in substance" a 
motion to withdraw his plea, which must be filed before sentencing. Id. at 7 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (motion to withdraw plea "shall be made by motion 
before sentence is announced")). The Court held that because Helbach's motion to 
withdraw his plea was filed months too late, the trial court had no jurisdiction to 
consider it and the court of appeals had no jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. at 7-8. 
2
 For the Court's convenience, the State has numbered the paragraphs of the 
unpublished decisions attached as addenda F, G & I. 
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Helbach next attempted to challenge his convictions in the Weber County 
cases by filing a petition for extraordinary relief in this Court under rule 19, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which also sought habeas corpus relief under 
appellate rule 20. R. 12-34. This Court denied that petition, explaining that rule 19 
requires that "no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists" and that Helbach had 
such a remedy available under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 193-94 
(Helbach v. Judge Roger Dutson, et al, 2004 UT App 480U (Memorandum Decision) 
("Helbach II")), Addendum G. The appellate court also denied the petition under 
Utah R. App. P. 20 because Helbach had stated no reason why the petition should 
not be directed to the district court. Id. at 4. The court referred the petition to the 
Second Judicial District Court to the extent that it raised issues for review under the 
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 - 405 
(West Supp. 2009), and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 4-5. 
In evaluating Helbach's claims under the PCRA, Second Judicial District 
Court initially denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition in its entirety. 
R. 197-204. However, the Court later reconsidered and agreed to allow some of 
Helbach's claims to go forward. R. 208-223 (Ruling and Order, dated May 16,2006 
("May 16 Order")), Addendum H. 
On January 30, 2006, Helbach filed documents in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah purporting to state claims under 28 USCA § 2254. 
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There, Helbach challenged the validity of his guilty pleas entered in the Weber 
County cases. The federal court dismissed that petition on July 7, 2008. 
Meanwhile, the Second Judicial Court, Davis County, dismissed claims 
virtually identical to those raised in the instant matter. See Helbach v. State, 2007 UT 
App 191U (Memorandum Decision), ('Helbach III"), Addendum I. In that case, 
Helbach claimed that his plea was not knowing and voluntary, the trial court erred 
in not sua sponte ordering a competency examination and ineffective assistance of 
counsel. See id. Helbach appealed that dismissal and this Court affirmed. Helbach 
III, 2007 UT App 191U at \ 7. 
On October 6, 2008, the Second Judicial District Court, Weber County, 
dismissed Helbach's post-conviction petition (the instant matter) challenging his 
guilty plea in the Weber County cases. R. 383-95 ,Addendum B. 
Helbach timely appealed. R. 398. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point LA, Helbach has failed to demonstrate his plea was not knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. During post-conviction and now on appeal, Helbach has 
argued that the trial court did not comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, in accepting the plea. However, a post-conviction petitioner is not 
entitled to relief based on the trial court's violation of rule 11 unless he can show 
that the violation rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. Helbach 
demonstrated no rule 11 error, let alone any error that rendered the plea unknowing 
and involuntary. 
Point LB. Helbach has not demonstrated that he was entitled to a sua sponte 
competency hearing. To show that he was entitled to a competency hearing, a 
petitioner must show that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to 
his competency at the time tie entered his plea. Although Helbach presented 
evidence showing that he may have suffered from some mental disorders at or near 
the time he entered his plea, he presented no evidence showing that he was 
incompetent or that there was a substantial question of possible doubt as to his 
competency. The post-conviction court therefore properly denied relief based on 
these claims. 
Point II.A. Helbach failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that his trial 
counsel was ineffective. Helbach claims he was incompetent and that his attorney 
11 
should have requested a competency evaluation, should not have recommended 
acceptance of the guilty plea or should have moved to withdraw the plea when he 
learned of Helbach7s mental health issues. However, mental illness does not 
automatically render a defendant incompetent and Helbach failed to demonstrate 
that he was incompetent. Because Helbach's apparent mental health issues did not 
render him incompetent, his attorney had no reason to question the plea bargain. 
Point II.B. Helbach claims his attorney was ineffective because he should 
have moved to suppress his confession to police. This claim fails because Helbach7s 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived any pre-plea constitutional violations. 
Point III. Helbach is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, first, because he 
never requested one and, second, because he did not establish disputed material 
facts that would have required a hearing. 
Point IV. Any remaining claims are inadequately briefed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
HELBACH HAS NOT PROVED HIS PLEA WAS UNKOWING 
OR INVOLUNTARY. 
A. The Trial Court Properly Ensured Helbach's Plea was 
Knowing and Voluntary, 
Helbach claims his guilty plea was not a "voluntary, intelligent and knowing 
admission of guilt with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts/' Aplt. 
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Br. at 9. In support, Helbach alleges the trial court failed to comply with rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In post-conviction proceedings, however, Rule 
11 violations alone are insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea. 
On appeal, Helbach claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary because 
inter alia the trial court did not advise him that: 
• A sentence of "five years to life" means he could be in prison for 
at least five years and perhaps for life, in violation of rule 11(e)(5), 
Aplt. Br. at 11; 
• He had until 30 days after his sentence to move to withdraw his 
guilty plea, in violation of rule 11(e)(7), id. at 10,12; 
• He had the right to appeal, in violation of rule 11(e)(8), e.g., id., at 
22; 
•The State had the burden of proving each element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of rule 11(e)(4)(A), id. 
• Helbach also claimed that the court did not explain the 
constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty (rule 11(e)(3)), 
the elements of aggravated robbery or the factual basis for the plea 
(rule 11(e)(4)(A) & (B)). E.g., id., at 9-11. 
The post-conviction court ruled that Helbach's claims failed to the extent that 
he alleged only technical violations of Rule 11, which did not demonstrate that his 
plea was in fact involuntary. R. 386. This ruling is correct. Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 
90, ^ 18,173 P.3d 842; accord Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 
1993). " '[0]n collateral attack of a conviction, the petitioner must show a 
constitutional violation to obtain relief/" Id. (citing Salazarf 852 P.2d at 991, n.6) 
13 
(emphasis added by Bluemel court). A plea is in fact knowing and voluntary if there 
is a factual basis for the plea and the petitioner understands and waives his privilege 
against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront 
witnesses. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). 
The post-conviction court also ruled that even when Helbach's claims are 
analyzed under the correct post-conviction review standards, they still do not 
demonstrate that his plea was unknowing or involuntary. R. 387-88. This ruling is 
also correct because Helbach's claims are flatly contradicted by the record. In the 
Plea Statement, Helbach affirms that: 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, 
threats, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to 
plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this statement 
have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an 
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in it 
as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes 
because all of the statements are correct. 
R. 290-91. 
Helbach also affirmed during the change-of-plea hearing that he understood 
and accepted the plea agreement and that he did so knowingly and voluntarily: 
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there [the Plea 
Statement], Mr. Helbach? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do. 
THE COURT: What's you level of education? 
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school. 
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you 
have any mental health condition today that would make it so you don't fully 
understanding what's happening? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
R. 302. 
Helbach's claims that he was not advised of the elements of aggravated 
robbery or of how his conduct met those elements are also contradicted by the 
record. In Utah, "[a] person commits robbery if . . . [he] unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of 
another from his person . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (a) (West 2004). The 
robbery is aggravated "if in the course of committing robbery, he . . . uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon/7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (a) (West 2004), 
which is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(a) (West 2004). 
In the Plea Statement, Helbach fully acknowledged the elements of the 
aggravated robbery and the factual basis for the plea: "I unlawfully and 
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intentionally took or attempted to take personal property from another by the 
threatened use of a gun/7 R. 39. He also stated: 
I stipulate and agree . . . that the following facts describe my 
conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty . . . 
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I attempted to take property from 
(1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon by use of a gun (1) and a knife (2). 
Id. 
In addition, the trial court reviewed the elements in more detail during 
the plea colloquy: 
THE COURT:... [Ujnder the most recent case from the Court of 
Appeals, we have to be very detailed on the elements. And I'll go over 
those again which may be somewhat duplicating what's in this written 
agreement but I want you to clearly understand what you're pleading 
to, what the elements are, and so Fm going to go over them in some 
detail. I'll ask, first on the case of February the 14th on case 1411, and 
that's the Arby's case, what would the elements have been had you 
gone to trial on that? 
MS. BEATON [prosecutor]: Do you want to state them? 
MR. CAINE: . . . This is a case, this is a situation wheie the 
defendant went in there, he indicated he had a weapon and attempting 
to get property, money in this case, and that's what happened. 
THE COURT: Did he obtain property or just attempt to gain property 
at Arby's? 
MR. CAINE: Yeah. He obtained the property. 
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THE COURT: Arby's[,] he got some money or property from them 
threatening them with a weapon? 
MR. CAINE: Money, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And on the 11th of March, D. Magoon, what 
are the — that says it was a knife. 
MR. CAINE: . . . This is the —at a Sinclair gas station actually. The 
individual was the person named there and there was a[n] indication that he 
had a knife and there was money from there also. 
THE COURT: And you got money then? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. So those then would be the elementsf: T]hat 
you did by use of force or fear[ — ]a knife, and then in the other case, a gun[ — ] 
steal money from persons[, which] you had no legal right to have. And you 
understand those are the elements? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
R. 304-05. 
Helbach also claims he was not advised that, if he went to trial, the State had 
the burden of proving every element of the crime. However, the Plea Statement 
explicitly states: "At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt/' R. 40. 
Helbach next complains that he was not advised of his right to appeal. 
Because Helbach pleaded guilty, he explicitly waived his right to appeal. Id.; see also 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App.1988) ("[A] voluntary guilty plea is a 
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waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations").3 If Helbach wished to appeal, he would first have had to 
timely move to withdraw his plea. See Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT ll^f 25,152 P.3d 
306 (" Absent a timely-filed motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this court does not 
have jurisdiction over a direct appeal to review the validity of the plea"). And he 
was advised that if he wished to withdraw his plea, he must file a written motion 
before sentencing. R. 42; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (Utah 2004). 
Helbach did not do so. Thus, he effectively had no appellate rights once he entered 
his guilty plea. 
In his appellate brief, Helbach claims that he should have been told that he 
had 30 days after sentencing to move to withdraw his plea. Aplt. Br. at 15. He 
claims that under State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 1065, "which was the 
governing law at the time of my proceedings, I should have been afforded 30 days 
after the time of sentencing to withdraw my plea." Id. (emphasis added by Helbach). 
Helbach is incorrect. Utah Code Ann. 77-13-6(1)(b), which became effective May 5, 
2003, states that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced." Thus, this provision was the governing law when Helbach 
3
 Petitioner could have timely challenged his sentence on appeal, but he did 
not do so. Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, f 37,122 P.3d 628. 
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entered his guilty plea on August 18, 2003. Helbach was properly advised that he 
must move to withdraw his plea before sentencing. He did not do so.4 
Finally, Helbach claims r/the court did not explain that the minimum I would 
serve was 5 years maximum of life . . ." Aplt. Br. at 25. On the first page of the Plea 
Statement— the same statement Helbach has repeatedly affirmed having read and 
understood —Helbach acknowledged that "I am pleading guilty to the following 
crimes:.. . 2 (cts) Ag. Robbery/7 which may be punished by "MlN/MAX AND/OR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY" sentences of "5-life USP and [$]20,000 fine on each." R. 38. 
Although expressed in abbreviated form, the language "5-life USP" clearly means 
that Helbach was pleading guilty to crimes that would result in a sentence at the 
Utah State Prison for a minimum of five years and up to life. Helbach understood 
this when he entered his guilty plea and it is absurd to suggest otherwise. 
In sum, the post-conviction court correctly ruled that Helbachs' plea was 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The Plea Statement and the trial court's 
colloquy with the defendant during the change-of-plea hearing clearly demonstrate 
that Helbach's plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Helbach has presented 
nothing to suggest otherwise. 
4
 Nor did Helbach move to withdraw his plea within 30 days of sentencing. 
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B. Helbach's Claim that the Trial Court Should Have 
Ordered a Competency Hearing Fails Because Nothing 
in the Record Raises a "Substantial Question Of 
Possible Doubt" Concerning His Competence. 
Helbach claims that the post-conviction court "committed error in denying 
relief on [his] claim that he was incompetent to plead guilty [and] that he was 
entitled to a competency hearing/' Appellant's Br. at 5. This claim is without merit. 
"A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and proceedings 
against such a defendant do not comport with due process/' State v. Young, 780 P.2d 
1233,1236 (Utah 1989) (citing Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402,402 (I960)); see also 
Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, 1f 12, 20 P.3d 382, The same standard applies to a 
determination of competency to stand trial and competency to plead guilty. Jacobs, 
2001 UT 17, % 15 n.3. 
"In determining whether a defendant is competent to [stand trial or] plead 
guilty, the trial court must consider whether the defendant has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him/7 State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 12; Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-15-2. "In determining whether the trial court erred by not holding a 
20 
competency hearing, a reviewing court considers the facts that were before the trial 
court when the plea was entered/7 Helbach II, 2004 UT App 480U, f 1. 
Competency to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea is, however, "a much 
narrower concept than moral or social wellness, and thus the fact that a defendant is 
twisted and disturbed does not necessarily mean he is unfit for trial'7 or unfit to 
enter a guilty plea. Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, \ 16. "A defendant may be fit for trial even 
though his mind is otherwise unsound/7 Id. This applies even though a person may 
be diagnosed as "suffering] from personality disorders, depression, psychotic 
episodes, and suicidal behaviors77 or "from chronic paranoid schizophrenia77 and 
"diminished ability to control his behavior,77 and even where he may be diagnosed 
as "actively psychotic.77 Id. at Tf^f 5, 7. "The fact that a person is mentally ill, 
displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a history of mental illness, 
does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.77 Id. at \ 16. 
In Utah, an order for a competency hearing "is mandatory only on the filing 
of a petition77 to determine competency. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281,285 (Utah 1985) 
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5). Thus, a trial court "has no statutory duty to 
order a hearing in the absence of a petition.77 Id. As a matter of constitutionally-
guaranteed due process, however, "[a] trial court must hold a competency hearing 
when there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to a defendant's 
competency at the time of the guilty plea/7 Jacobs, 2001 UT 17, f 13 (internal 
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quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, the court must hold a 
competency hearing when there is a substantial question of possible doubt as to 
whether a defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him/7 Holland, 921 P.2d at 433 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Because a post-conviction petition is civil 
in nature, "Helbach had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency existed at the time 
he pleaded guilty/7 Helbach 11, 2004 UT App 480U, % 2. 
Accordingly, the issue for the post-conviction court was whether Helbach met 
his burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that he was 
incompetent to enter his plea or that "a substantial question of possible doubt" as to 
his competency existed at the time he pled guilty. See Utah Code Annotated § 77-
35a-105 (West Supp. 2009) ("The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to 
relief7). 
In support of his claim that he was incompetent or that a competency hearing 
was required, Helbach attached copies of a military evaluation of his mental health, 
prepared on September 17, 2001, and a diagnostic evaluation, prepared June 18, 
2003, for use in connection with his sentencing. See R. 68-70 (Entrance Physical 
22 
Standards Board (EPSBD) Proceedings/' dated September 17, 2001 (hereinafter 
"Military Evaluation")); R. 1 (Psychological Evaluation, dated June 18, 2003 
("Psychological Evaluation). 
In reviewing identical claims Helbach raised in his post-conviction challenge 
to his conviction in the Davis County case, this Court found Helbach had 
established neither his incompetence nor any reason to question the knowing and 
voluntary nature of his guilty plea. See generally Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191U. In 
that case, Helbach claimed he was incompetent when he entered his plea and that 
his incompetence was established by his 2001 Military Evaluation and his 2003 
Psychological Evaluation, prepared for use in sentencing. Id. at f^ 3. The post-
conviction court in the Davis County case rejected these claims and this Court 
affirmed, holding that Helbach had not met his burden to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a substantial question of possible doubt as to his competency 
existed at the time he pleaded guilty. Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191 U, t 2. This 
Court stated that Helbach 
responded appropriately to the court's questions, affirmed his 
understanding of the written plea agreement, and acknowledged that 
he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty. . . . The post-
conviction court correctly determined that the facts before the district 
court at the time of the change of plea did not give rise to a substantial 
question of possible doubt about [Helbach's] competency. 
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Id.5 
Similarly, here, the post-conviction court ruled there was no evidence before 
the trial court that would have raised a substantial question of possible doubt about 
Helbach's competence to plead guilty. R. 390. The record shows that Helbach fully 
participated in the change-of-plea hearing by responding coherently to the court's 
questions, repeatedly affirming that he understood the contents of the Plea 
Statement and acknowledging that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading 
guilty and waiving his constitutional rights: 
THE COURT: All right. Is there a written plea agreement? 
MR. CAINE [defendant's counsel]: There is. 
THE COURT: And you understand what's in there, Mr. Helbach? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I do. 
THE COURT: What's you level of education? 
THE DEFENDANT: Post high school tech school. 
THE COURT: And you read and write and understand well? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
5
 Although the Utah Supreme Court has held that res judicata does not in itself 
bar relitigation of previously adjudicated issues or claims raised on post-conviction 
petition, the court has stated that "a prior adjudication of the same ground for relief 
is sufficient to bar relitigation on that ground, absent unusual circumstances." Hurst 
v. Cook 777 P.2d 1029,1037 (Utah 1989). 
24 
THE COURT: Are you on any medications, alcohol, drugs or do you have 
any mental health condition today tlmt would make it so you don't fully 
unde?'sta?zding wliat's liappening? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: And are you satisfied with the legal representation 
you've received? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. If you wish, you may go ahead and sign that. 
MR. C AINE: Actually, he signed it earlier, I can affirm. We'll just make 
a record, Your Honor. Aaron, you and reviewed this document and talked 
about this and it bears your signature and you just signed it in the lockup in 
there a minute ago; is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That is your signature? And do you waive or give up 
your preliminary hearing rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You understand you've had the right to have 
preliminary hearings? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
25 
R. 301-03 (emphasis added) see also R. 293-98 (Plea Statement). The trial court also 
had an opportunity to observe Helbach's demeanor during the hearing and 
apparently saw nothing amiss.6 
In sum, there was nothing before the trial court to indicate Helbach was not 
competent during the change-of-plea hearing and none of the psychological 
evaluations suggests otherwise. Thus, Helbach7s unsupported, self-serving claims 
that he was mentally incompetent should be rejected. 
II. 
THE POST-CONVICTION COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT HELBACH HAD NOT MET HIS BURDEN TO 
ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
Helbach has not met his burden to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel. The burden to prove such a claim is extremely high. To prevail, Helbach 
must meet the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), and adopted by the courts in Utah. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 
989 (Utah 1997). Helbach must establish that: 
1. His attorney's performance was deficient, and 
Additionally, in the Certificate of Defense Attorney attached to the plea 
statement, trial counsel certified, "I know defendant has read the statement or that I 
have read it to defendant; I have discussed it with defendant and believe that 
defendant fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and 
physically competent/7 See, e.g., R. 297. 
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2. The deficient performance prejudiced his defense. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Petition's claims fail under both prongs. 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Helbach must demonstrate that 
counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. This requires a showing that Helbach's attorney made 
errors so egregious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed 
to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id.; accord Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
522 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 431(1994); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,186 (Utah 
1990). To establish that such serious errors occurred, a defendant must identify 
counsel's specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524,532 (Utah App. 
1997) (citations omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality.'" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157,1162 (Utah App. 1998) (citing Fernandez v. 
Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must "rebut the strong presumption 
that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 19, 12 P.3d 92. To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance, petitioner must demonstrate '"that counsel's actions were not 
conscious trial strategy,'" and "that there was a Tack of any conceivable tactical basis' for 
27 
counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. 
Elliftitz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah. App.1992)). 
Furthermore, it is not enough for petitioner to show that counsel's 
performance could have been better. The Sixth Amendment entitles petitioner "only 
to effective assistance of counsel, not to a right to the best or most complete 
representation available/7 State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250,1259 (Utah 1993); see also 
Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999) (the court may find counsel's 
performance constitutionally deficient only if petitioner establishes that counsel's 
performance was "completely unreasonable, not merely wrong."). 
The post-conviction court properly determined that Helbach's knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea waived all ineffective assistance claims concerning pre-plea 
representation. R. 216; see also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant who pleads guilty "is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations") (emphasis added); State v. Hardy, 
2002 UT App 244, ^ 8 , 1 3 , 54 P.3d 645 (declining to address pre-plea claims that 
protective order statutes were overbroad and vague because defendant entered 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea). Thus, the only unwaived claims concern his 
counsel's representation during the plea negotiation process. These claims would 
be (1) that his counsel should have been aware of Helbach's alleged incompetence 
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and should not have allowed him to plead guilty, see, e.g., Aplt. Br. at 4-5, and (2) his 
counsel should not have considered his confession in recommending that he plead 
guilty. E.g., id. at 19. 
These claims fail. First, Helbach's claim that his trial attorney was ineffective 
because he did not move to suppress the confession was waived by the knowing 
and voluntary guilty plea. Second, the claim that his attorney was ineffective 
because he should have realized Helbach was incompetent is not supported by the 
record. 
A. Helbach Waived His Claim That His Trial Counsel was 
Ineffective for Not Challenging the Admissibility of 
His Confession. 
Helbach7s knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived his claim that his 
attorney was ineffective for not attempting to suppress the confession. Accordingly, 
the post-conviction court properly dismissed this claim. 
A post-conviction petitioner cannot raise claims concerning pre-plea 
constitutional violations, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
because such claims are waived by a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. 'The 
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea, however, can 
spare a defendant the consequences of her plea only if the defendant makes out the 
same case required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea 
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was not knowing and voluntary." State v. Rhinhart, 2007 UT 61,113,167 P.3d 1046. 
A defendant who pleads guilty "is deemed to have admitted all of the essential 
elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, 
including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations/' State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1278 
(Utah 1989) (emphasis added); see also State v. Hardy, 2002 UT App 244, |% 8,13, 54 
P.3d 645 (declining to address pre-plea claims that protective order statutes were 
overbroad and vague because defendant entered knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea). Furthermore, a voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of the elements 
of the offense. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969); accord Salazar v. 
Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,1313 (Utah 
1987). 
As demonstrated in section LA., above, Helbach's plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily entered. Accordingly, he cannot claim that his attorney was ineffective 
for not attempting to suppress the confession. 
B. Helbach Has Not Demonstrated that His Trial Counsel 
Was Ineffective For Not Requesting a Competency 
Hearing. 
Helbach has claimed that his counsel was ineffective because he did not move 
for a competency hearing, Aplt. Br. at 4, even though he allegedly knew Helbach 
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attempted suicide at the Davis County Jail and that he displayed symptoms of 
mental illness while in the military. Id. at 5. This claim is without merit. 
As discussed in section LB., above, even assuming Helbach suffers from some 
form of mental illness, that alone does not establish he was incompetent to stand 
trial or enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. As the Court of Appeals 
observed in defendant's previous and virtually identical case: "The fact that a 
person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a 
history of mental illness, does not mean that he or she is incompetent to stand 
trial/" Helbach III, 2007 UT App 191U, f 1 (quoting Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT17,116, 
20 P.3d 382); see also Kohler v. Kelly, 890 F. Supp. 207, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (suicide 
attempt insufficient to alert counsel to competency issue where nothing else in the 
record could substantiate a finding of mental incompetence), ajfd, 58 F.3d 58 (2nd 
Cir. 1995), cert denied, 516 U.S. 995 (1999); cf. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,168,178-
80 (1975) (suicide attempt coupled with history of irrational behavior required an 
inquiry into Drope's competence). 
Because Helbach has offered no evidence to establish his incompetence, the 
post-conviction court corrected ruled that his attorney had no reason to think he 
was incompetent, especially when the record demonstrates that Helbach was 
attentive and responsive at the plea hearing. R. 391. During the plea colloquy, 
Helbach also affirmed he was mentally competent and not under the influence of 
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drugs or suffering from mental illness. Id. Accordingly, Helbach has not 
demonstrated his attorney was ineffective in proceeding with the guilty plea. 
III. 
HELBACH WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING. 
Helbach claims the post-conviction court erred in not ordering an evidentiary 
hearing because there were factual disputes that needed to be resolved. Aplt. Br. at 
28. This claims is without merit. 
First, Helbach never requested an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, he 
simply asked that the court "set aside or vacate the plea and conviction and allow 
the defendant to proceed to trial/' R. 33. In his " Answer" to the State's motion to 
dismiss, Helbach "reques[ed] that the court order briefing on any issue that the 
court warrents [sic] more treatment... "R. 246. Because Helbach never requested an 
evidentiary hearing, he must show on appeal that it was plain error for the post-
conviction court not to have done so sua sponte. See State v. Richardson, 2009 UT App 
40, ^ 7-8, 204 P.3d 872 (because defendant failed to request evidentiary hearing 
during sentencing, claim on appeal reviewed for plain error); see also, id., at f 8 (to 
establish plain error, defendant must show "that an error must have occurred, must 
have been harmful, and should have been obvious to the trial court"). Helbach had 
not argued plain error or any other exception to the preservation rule, so this Court 
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should not reach it. State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229, n.5 (Utah 1995). This claim 
fails for that reason. 
Second, even if Helbach had requested an evidentiary hearing, he cannot 
show that the post-conviction would have granted his request. "An evidentiary 
hearing is necessary only when a material fact is in dispute/7 State v. Clegg, 2002 UT 
App 279, \ 9, 54 P.3d 653. In his petition, Helbach did not meet his burden to 
proffer or identify evidence demonstrating a material factual dispute. Nor has he 
done so in his brief on appeal. Helbach claims an evidentiary hearing was necessary 
because the case is "fact sensitive" due to his "mechanical[] answers" to questions 
during the plea colloquy, which he claims did not establish the plea was made 
knowingly. Aplt. Br. at 30. Additionally, he claims an evidentiary hearing is 
needed to sort through "the issues involved in the ineffective counsel claim" and to 
develop "proof of appellant's alibis." Id. Because Helbach offers no evidence to 
support these allegations, they cannot create a factual dispute requiring an 
evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the post-conviction court had no basis for 
scheduling an evidentiary hearing, even if Helbach had requested one. 
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IV. 
ANY REMAINING APPELLATE CLAIMS ARE 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND MUST BE REJECTED. 
Any remaining claims in Helbach's brief must be dismissed because they are 
inadequately briefed. "It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed/' State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,304 (Utah 
1998). Under rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellate brief "must 
be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters/' Utah R. App. 
P. 24(k). "An issue is inadequately briefed when 'the overall analysis of the issue is 
so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court/" 
Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370, % 8,995 P.2d 14 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
While a reviewing court may grant an appellant "some leeway due to his 
status as a pro se litigant, th[e] court will not assume his 'burden of argument and 
research/" Treffv. Hinckley, 2001 UT 50, lj 11, 26 P.3d 212 (quoting State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 204 (Utah 1998)) (in turn quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 
(Utah 1988)) (additional internal quotation marks omitted). "As a general rule, a 
party who represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and 
practice as any qualified member of the bar [.]" Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 
34 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the post-conviction court's decision denying post-conviction relief. 
Respectfully submitted September 24, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
BRETT J. DEL££>RTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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1213 (Utah 1983). Although pro se litigants "'should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged. . . .'" Id. (quoting Heathman v. 
Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266,372 P.2d 990,991 (1962)), they still must follow the appellate 
rules. Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT11, f 4, 67 P.3d 1000. 
Helbach's brief consists largely of renumbered pages from his post-conviction 
petition. Pages 4-8 of his brief consists of excerpted pages from the petition alleing 
instances of what appellant regards as ineffective assistance of counsel with no 
analysis or any attempt to apply controlling authority. Similarly, pages 9-14, also 
excerpted from the petition, reiterate an irrelevant discussion of the trial court's 
alleged failure to comply with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 
accepting appellant's guilty plea. 
As a result, most of Helbach's claims are cryptic and somewhat haphazard. 
The State has attempted to cover the claims addressed by the post-conviction court 
as well as any others that appear remotely colorable. Any additional claims should 
be rejected for inadequate briefing. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 77. Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Kr= 
Chapter 15. Inquiry Into Sanity of Defendant 
§ 77-15-5. Order for hearing—Stay of other proceedings-
Examinations of defendant-Scope of examination and report 
(1) When a petition is filed pursuant to Section 77-15-3 raising the issue of the 
defendant's competency to stand trial or when the court raises the issue of the defendant's 
competency pursuant to Section 77-15-4, the court in which proceedings are pending 
shall stay all proceedings. If the proceedings are in a court other than the district court in 
which the petition is filed, the district court shall notify that court of the filing of the 
petition. The district court in which the petition is filed shall pass upon the sufficiency of 
the allegations of incompetency. If a petition is opposed by either party, the court shall, 
prior to granting or denying the petition, hold a limited hearing solely for the purpose of 
determining the sufficiency of the petition. If the court finds that the allegations of 
incompetency raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency to stand trial, it 
shall enter an order for a hearing on the mental condition of the person who is the subject 
of the petition. 
(2)(a) After the granting of a petition and prior to a full competency hearing, the court 
may order the Department of Human Services to examine the person and to report to the 
court concerning the defendant's mental condition. 
(b) The defendant shall be examined by at least two mental health experts not involved 
in the current treatment of the defendant. 
(c) If the issue is sufficiently raised in the petition or if it becomes apparent that the 
defendant may be incompetent due to mental retardation, at least one expert 
experienced in mental retardation assessment shall evaluate the defendant. Upon 
appointment of the experts, the petitioner or other party as directed by the court shall 
provide information and materials to the examiners relevant to a determination of the 
defendant's competency and shall provide copies of the charging document, arrest or 
incident reports pertaining to the charged offense, known criminal history information, 
and known prior mental health evaluations and treatments. 
(d) The prosecuting and defense attorneys shall cooperate in providing the relevant 
information and materials to the examiners, and the court may make the necessary 
orders to provide the information listed in Subsection (2)(c) to the examiners. The court 
may provide in its order for a competency examination of a defendant that custodians 
of mental health records pertaining to the defendant shall provide those records to the 
examiners without the need for consent of the defendant or further order of the court. 
(3) During the examination under Subsection (2), unless the court or the executive 
director of the department directs otherwise, the defendant shall be retained in the same 
custody or status he was in at the time the examination was ordered. 
(4) The experts shall in the conduct of their examination and in their report to the court 
consider and address, in addition to any other factors determined to be relevant by the 
experts: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties, if 
applicable, that may be imposed in the proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the nature and 
quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the defendant's competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's demeanor and affect and 
ability to participate in the proceedings. 
(5) If the expert's opinion is that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, the expert shall 
indicate in the report: 
(a) which of the above factors contributes to the defendant's incompetency; 
(b) the nature of the defendant's mental disorder or mental retardation and its 
relationship to the factors contributing to the defendant's incompetency; 
(c) the treatment or treatments appropriate and available; and 
(d) the defendant's capacity to give informed consent to treatment to restore 
competency. 
(6) The experts examining the defendant shall provide an initial report to the court and 
the prosecuting and defense attorneys within 30 days of the receipt of the court's order. 
The report shall inform the court of the examiner's opinion concerning the competency of 
the defendant to stand trial, or, in the alternative, the examiner may inform the court in 
writing that additional time is needed to complete the report. If the examiner informs the 
court that additional time is needed, the examiner shall have up to an additional 30 days 
to provide the report to the court and counsel. The examiner must provide the report 
within 60 days from the receipt of the court's order unless, for good cause shown, the 
court authorizes an additional period of time to complete the examination and provide the 
report. 
(7) Any written report submitted by the experts shall: 
(a) identify the specific matters referred for evaluation; 
(b) describe the procedures, techniques, and tests used in the examination and the 
purpose or purposes for each; 
(c) state the expert's clinical observations, findings, and opinions on each issue referred 
for examination by the court, and indicate specifically those issues, if any, on which the 
expert could not give an opinion; and 
(d) identify the sources of information used by the expert and present the basis for the 
expert's clinical findings and opinions. 
(8)(a) Any statement made by the defendant in the course of any competency 
examination, whether the examination is with or without the consent of the defendant, 
any testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and any other fruits of the 
statement may not be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal 
proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has 
introduced evidence. The evidence may be admitted, however, where relevant to a 
determination of the defendant's competency. 
(b) Prior to examining the defendant, examiners should specifically advise the 
defendant of the limits of confidentiality as provided under Subsection (8)(a). 
(9) When the report is received the court shall set a date for a mental hearing which shall 
be held in not less than five and not more than 15 days, unless the court enlarges the time 
for good cause. Any person or organization directed by the department to conduct the 
examination may be subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. If the experts are in conflict as 
to the competency of the defendant, all experts should be called to testify at the hearing if 
reasonably available. The court may call any examiner to testify at the hearing who is not 
called by the parties If the court calls an examiner, counsel for the parties may cross-
examine the expert. 
(10) A person shall be presumed competent unless the court, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, finds the person incompetent to proceed. The burden of proof is upon the 
proponent of incompetency at the hearing. An adjudication of incompetency to proceed 
shall not operate as an adjudication of incompetency to give informed consent for 
medical treatment or for any other purpose, unless specifically set forth in the court order. 
(1 l)(a) If the court finds the defendant incompetent to stand trial, its order shall contain 
findings addressing each of the factors in Subsections (4)(a) and (b) of this section. The 
order issued pursuant to Subsection 77-15-6(1) which the court sends to the facility 
where the defendant is committed or to the person who is responsible for assessing his 
progress toward competency shall be provided contemporaneously with the 
transportation and commitment order of the defendant, unless exigent circumstances 
require earlier commitment in which case the court shall forward the order within five 
working days of the order of transportation and commitment of the defendant. 
(b) The order finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial shall be accompanied by: 
(i) copies of the reports of the experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of 
examination if not provided pre\ iously; 
(ii) copies of any of the psychiatric, psychological or social work reports submitted 
to the court relative to the mental condition of the defendant; and 
(iii) any other documents made available to the court by either the defense or the 
prosecution, pertaining to the defendant's current or past mental condition. 
(12) If the court finds it necessary to order the defendant transported prior to the 
completion of findings and compilation of documents required under Subsection (11), the 
transportation and commitment order delivering the defendant to the Utah State Hospital, 
or other mental health facility as directed by the executive director of the Department of 
Human Services or his designee, shall indicate that the defendant's commitment is based 
upon a finding of incompetency, and the mental health facility's copy of the order shall be 
accompanied by the reports of any experts filed with the court pursuant to the order of 
examination. The executive director of the Department of Human Services or his 
designee may refuse to accept a defendant as a patient unless he is accompanied by a 
transportation and commitment order which is accompanied by the reports. 
(13) Upon a finding of incompetency to stand trial by the court, the prosecuting and 
defense attorneys shall provide information and materials relevant to the defendant's 
competency to the facility where the defendant is committed or to the person responsible 
for assessing his progress towards competency. In addition to any other materials, the 
prosecuting attorney shall pro\ ide 
(a) copies of the charging document and supporting affidavits or other documents used 
in the determination of probable cause; 
(b) arrest or incident reports prepared by a law enforcement agency pertaining to the 
charged offense; and 
(c) information concerning the defendant's known criminal history. 
(14) The court may make any reasonable order to insure compliance with this section. 
(15) Failure to comply with this section shall not result in the dismissal of criminal 
charges. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2; Laws 1988, c. 1, $ 399; Laws 1990. c. 127, $ 1; Laws 1991, c. 
166. § 4; Laws 1993, c. 142, § 2; Laws 1994, c. 162, $ 4; Laws 2002, 5th Sp.Sess., c. 8. $ 
132. eff. Sept 8,2002; Laws 2003. c. 82. $ 1. eff. Ma\ 5, 2003: Laws 2008. c. 212, § K 
eff May 5. 2008. 
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session 
Addendum B 
BRETT J. DELPORTO (6862) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
•im&T 
COURT DDL 
*n iu: I f2ms 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND < 
VD2455971S 
fAND 
060900429 STATE OF UTAH 
pages: 15 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AARON HELBACH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
Case No. 060900429 
Judse Roser S. Dutson 
By Memorandum dated May 21, 2008, this Court granted the State's Motion to 
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Now being fully advised, the Court enters 
the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 21, 2003, petitioner was charged in Second District Court, 
Weber County, with three counts of aggravated robbery in three separate informations. 
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See case nos. 031901411, 031901412 and 031901413 ("the Weber County cases"). In 
case no. 031901411, it was alleged that petitioner, claiming to have a gun, robbed an 
Arby's restaurant on February 14, 2003. In case no. 031901412, it was alleged that 
petitioner, claiming to have a knife, robbed a Sinclair station on March 11, 2003. 
Petitioner was also charged in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County with 
two armed robberies of convenience stores that occurred on February 13, 2003. See case 
no. 031700453 ("the Davis County case"). 
2. Petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty to a total of three counts of aggravated 
robbery. On April 7, 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery 
in the Davis County case and the other count of aggravated robbery in that case was 
dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. On August 18, 2003, petitioner pleaded guilty to 
two counts of aggravated robbery in the Weber County cases 
3. In exchange for petitioner's guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery 
in the Weber County cases (case nos. 031901411 and 031901412), the State agreed to 
dismiss the third count (case no. 031901413) and to recommend that any prison term be 
imposed concurrently with any term imposed in the Davis County case. 
4. During the August 18, 2003, change-of-plea hearing in the Weber County 
cases, the contents of the Plea Statement were incorporated into the record through a 
colloquy among the Court, the petitioner and defense counsel. 
5. On September 8, 2003, petitioner was sentenced to two terms of five years 
to life at the Utah State Prison. 
.? -
6. Petitioner filed no timely appeal. 
7. On March 5, 2004, petitioner filed a pleading in the Weber County 
criminal cases captioned "Motion to be Re-Sentenced Nunc Pro Tunc" in which he 
claimed inter alia that his plea was improperly and involuntarily entered due to 
mental illness. This Court denied the motion by order dated July 11, 2004. 
8. On August 9, 2004, petitioner filed a "Notice of Appeal/' 
9. On November 2, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the 
appeal. The appeals court noted that petitioner's motion to be resentenced w7as "in 
substance" a motion to withdraw his plea, which must be filed before sentencing. 
Because petitioner's motion to withdraw his plea was filed months too late, the 
trial court had no jurisdiction to consider it and the court of appeals had no 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
10 Petitioner next attempted to challenge his convictions in the Weber County 
cases by filing a petition for extraordinary relief under rule 19, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which also sought habeas corpus relief under appellate rule 20. 
11. The Utah Court of Appeals denied that petition, explaining that rule 19 
requires that "no plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists," but that petitioner had such a 
remedy available under rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court referred the 
petition to the Second Judicial District Court to the extent that it raised issues for review 
under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 -110 
(West 2004), and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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12. In evaluating petitioner's claims under the PCRA, this Court initially 
denied the requested relief and dismissed the petition in its entirety. However, the Court 
later reconsidered, agreed to allow some of petitioner's claims to go forward and ordered 
the State to file a response. 
13. Meanwhile, the Second Judicial Court, Davis County, dismissed virtually 
identical claims petitioner made in the post-conviction challenge to his guilty plea in the 
Davis County case. Petitioner appealed that dismissal and, on June 1, 2007, the Utah 
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Helbach v. State, 2007 UT 
App 191 U, TJ2 (Memorandum Decision). 
14. The State filed a Response to the petition challenging petitioner's 
convictions in the Weber County cases, requesting that it be dismissed. 
15. On May 21, 2008, this Court granted the State's motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In the post-conviction petition, petitioner claim his plea was invalid due to 
violations of rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as other alleged 
violations of rules governing the entry of guilty pleas. 
2. Petitioner's claims fail to the extent that he alleges only technical violations 
of rule 11 governing the entry of guilty pleas because he has failed in his burden to 
demonstrate that his plea was in fact involuntary. Bluemel v. State, 2007 UT 90, f^ 18, 
173 P.3d 842; accordSalazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993). 
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3. Under the correct post-conviction review standards, petitioner cannot 
demonstrate that his plea was unknowing or involuntary because such claims are 
contradicted by petitioner's Plea Statement, in which he affirms that he was entering his 
guilty plea freely and without duress, as well as petitioner's testimony during his change-
of-plea hearing, during which petitioner affirmed that he understood and accepted the 
terms of the plea agreement and that he was doing so knowingly and voluntarily. 
4. Petitioner's also claims that he was not advised of the elements of 
aggravated robbery or of how his conduct met those elements. These claims are also 
contradicted by the record. In the Plea Statement, petitioner also fully acknowledged the 
elements of the aggravated robbery and the factual basis for the plea: "I unlawfully and 
intentionally took or attempted to take personal property from another by the threatened 
use of a gun." 
5. The Plea Statement also states: 
I stipulate and agree . . . that the following facts describe my conduct and the 
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a 
basis for the court to accept my guilty . . . pleas and prove the elements of the 
crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty: On 2-14-2003 and 3-11-2003 I attempted 
to take property from (1) Arby's and (2) D. Magoon by use of a gun (1) and a 
knife (2). 
6. In addition, the trial court also reviewed the elements in more detail during 
the plea colloquy to ensure petitioner understood. 
7. Petitioner also claims he was not advised that, if he went to trial, the State 
had the burden of proving every element of the crime. However, the Plea Statement 
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explicitly states: "At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of 
the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." 
8. Petitioner next complains that he was not advised of his right to appeal. 
Because petitioner pleaded guilty, he explicitly waived his right to appeal. If petitioner 
wished to appeal, he would first have to timely move to withdraw his plea. The Plea 
Statement advised petitioner that if he wished to withdraw his plea, he must file a written 
motion before sentencing. Petitioner did not do so. Thus, he effectively had no appellate 
rights once he entered his guilty plea. 
9. Petitioner claims "the court never explained that I must be imprisoned for 5 
years before being eligible for parole" and that he could be imprisoned for life. This 
claim is without merit. On the first page of the Plea Statement—the same statement 
petitioner has repeatedly affirmed having read and understood—petitioner acknowledges 
that "I am pleading guilty to the following crimes: . . . 2 (cts) Ag. Robbery," which may 
be punished by "MIN/MAX \ND/OR MINIMUM MANDATORY" sentences of "5-life USP 
and [$]20.000 fine on each." Although expressed in abbreviated form, the language "5-
life USP" clearly means that petitioner was pleading guilty to crimes that would result in 
a sentence at the Utah State Prison for a minimum of five years and up to life. 
10. Petitioner claims that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because he 
was m entail} incompetent at the time it was entered. He also claims the Court and his 
defense attorney erred in not discovering his incompetence and requesting a competency 
examination. 
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11. Under Utah law, "[n]o person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried 
for a public offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1 (West 2004). Incompetence to proceed 
is defined as a defendant's 'inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or. . . his 
inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with 
a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 (West 2004). 
12. The Utah Supreme Court has held that ;t[a] trial court must hold a 
competency hearing when there is 'a substantial question of possible doubt as to a 
defendant's competency at the time of the guilty plea.'" Jacobs v. State, 2001 UT 17, If 
13, 20 P.3d 382 (citation omitted). In determining whether the trial court should have 
ordered a competency hearing, "only those facts that were before the [trial] court when 
the plea was entered" should be considered. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 50, 63 P.3d 
731. 
13. In support of his alleged incompetence, petitioner offers reports from 
doctors, psychologists and criminal justice evaluators, which he claims show that he was 
incompetent to plead guilty. These reports, however illuminating they may be for 
purposes of illustrating petitioner's mental health issues, provide no reason to doubt his 
competence to plead guilty. The Utah Court of Appeals, which also evaluated the reports 
because defendant used them to support identical claims raised in his post-conviction 
challenge to his guilty plea in the Davis County case, concluded that the reports "assessed 
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mental health, not competency," and were, therefore, irrelevant to petitioner's 
competence. Helbach v. State. 2007 UT App 191 U, j^ 2 (Memorandum Decision). 
14. Similarly, in this case, there was nothing before the trial court to raise a 
substantial question of possible doubt about petitioner's competence to plead guilty. 
Petitioner fully participated in the change-of-plea hearing by responding coherently to the 
court's questions, repeatedly affirming that he understood the contents of the Plea 
Statement, and that he was knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty and waiving his 
constitutional rights. The trial court also had an opportunity to observe petitioner's 
demeanor during the hearing and detected no sign of incompetence or mental illness. 
15. Petitioner next claims ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail, 
petitioner must establish that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the 
deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687(1984). 
16. This Court previously determined petitioner's knowing and voluntary guilty 
plea waived all ineffective assistance claims concerning pre-plea representation. The 
only unwaived claims concern his counsel's representation during the plea negotiation 
process. 
17. Petitioner claimed that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to 
move for a competency hearing even though he allegedly knew petitioner attempted 
suicide at the Davis County Jail and that he displayed symptoms of mental illness while 
in the military. 
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18. However, because petitioner has offered no evidence to establish his 
incompetence, there is no reason to believe his attorney had any reason to think he was 
incompetent, especially when the record demonstrates that petitioner was attentive and 
responsive at the plea hearing. He also affirmed he was mentally competent and not 
under the influence of drugs or mental illness. Accordingly, petitioner has not 
demonstrated his attorney was ineffective in proceeding with the guilty plea. 
19. Nor has petitioner offered any evidence to substantiate his claim that his 
attorney erroneously advised him to plead guilty, despite supposed evidence that 
petitioner's confession was coerced. To succeed on this claim, petitioner must first 
demonstrate that there wras enough evidence to support a claim that the confession was 
coerced and that a motion to suppress would have been meritorious. See United States v. 
Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 360 (7th Cir.2005) ("When the claim of ineffective assistance 
is based on counsel's failure to present a motion to suppress, we have required that a 
defendant prove the motion was meritorious."), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 1097 (2006). 
20. The Utah Supreme Court has identified a non-exhaustive list of objective 
and subjective factors that should be employed to determine whether, under the totality of 
the circumstances, a confession was improperly coerced. State v Rettenberger, 1999 UT 
80, 984 P.2d 1009. "Objective" factors are potentially coercive interrogation techniques 
such as misrepresentations, the "false friend" technique and improper threats of 
punishment or promises of leniency. Id. at ffl[ 20-32. "Subjective" factors include 
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characteristics of the defendant such as age. maturity, intelligence and possible mental 
impairments that make a suspect susceptible to manipulation. Id. at ^ 37. 
21. Petitioner has offered no evidence whatsoever to support the existence of 
any factors, subjective or objective, as identified in Rettenberger. Rather, petitioner 
merely asserts that he was "manipulated" and that "the prosecution and defense played on 
my mental illnesses." He also claims that his counsel "failed to properly investigate the 
plea bargain," "failed to investigate and prepare a defense," "failed to make an 
independent investigation into the Weber County confessions.. ." and "failed . . . to 
suppress incompetent confession." But he provides no evidence or even specific 
examples to back up his claims. In short, petitioner offers nothing but his own self-
serving and highly generalized allegations of coercion. Because petitioner has failed to 
offer any evidence or even any specific examples of improper police conduct, it is 
impossible for him to demonstrate that his attorney had any reason to question the 
admissibility of the confession. 
22. Petitioner claims that the Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) that was 
prepared for sentencing in his case was inaccurate. Further, he claims he did not receive 
the report until nine months after sentencing. These claims are meritless. 
23. A court may order a pre-sentence report from the department of corrections 
if more information about the defendant is necessary for sentencing purposes. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (West 2004). When a report is requested, the department is required to 
provide the report to the defendant's attorney three working days before sentencing. 
-10-
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a). Any inaccuracies in the report should be resolved 
before sentencing if possible. Id. If inaccuracies cannot be resolved before sentencing, 
they should be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, who may grant an 
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies. Id. If a party fails to 
challenge the report's accuracy at the time of sentencing, ''that matter shall be considered 
to be waived." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b). 
24. The cover page of the PSIR lists its due date as May 14, 2003 and lists the 
sentencing date as May 19, 2003. Presumably, the report was available on its due date, 
which was well before the actual sentencing on September 8, 2003. At the time of 
sentencing, the report had been provided to the trial court—it was referred to repeatedly 
during the hearing—and presumably also to defense counsel. Although not explicitly 
stated, it is clear from the context that petitioner was also familiar with the contents of the 
PSIR. Because petitioner failed to point out any alleged inaccuracies at sentencing, any 
claims concerning the inaccuracies is waived. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(b). 
25. Additionally, even if petitioner's claims were not waived, the report does 
not appear to be inaccurate. The only specific inaccuracy petitioner mentions concerns 
his claim he was in Youth Corrections "custody" from 1996 to 2001. 
26. However, it is not clear how7 this comment is related to any alleged 
inaccuracy. The PSIR indicates that petitioner was placed in a Youth Corrections 
community program on July 7, 1996 for rape or sexual abuse of a child under 14 and that 
this status was continued on January 29, 1997 for assault. On September 22, 1997, he 
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was placed in a secure facility for lewdness and that status was continued on October 2, 
1997, for sodomy on a victim under the age of 14. He was paroled on February 8, 2000 
and Youth Corrections jurisdiction was terminated on May 29. 2001. Thus, petitioner 
was in fact under the jurisdiction of Youth Corrections from 1996 to 2001. If by 
"custody" petitioner means that he was incarcerated in a Youth Corrections facility from 
1996 to 2001, then there may be a discrepancy. Still, it is unclear whether the report is 
inaccurate or whether the apparent discrepancy is simply due to a difference in 
terminology. 
27. More fundamentally, even assuming that petitioner has identified 
inaccuracies in the report, he has failed to demonstrate how any inaccuracy prejudiced 
him in any wray. Petitioner has not claimed that he did not commit any of felonies listed 
in the PSIR; rather, he only seems to take issue with his custody status from 1996 to 
2001. Because this alleged inaccuracy had no apparent impact on the court's decision— 
and defendant has not suggested how it could have affected the court's decision— 
petitioner cannot show any prejudice. Accordingly, this claim is without merit. 
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ORDER 
Based on the motions, memoranda and other pleadings filed by both parties, and 
based on the arguments of counsel and petitioner, and because there is good cause for 
doing so, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
The State's motion to dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief is GRANTED. 
The petition's claims are DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and the Court 
DENIES post-conviction relief on all claims. 
Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial 
court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-l 10 (West 2004). 
DATED this 7& day of $ne , 2008. 
BY THE CO 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Second4udicial District Court Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
/fypUh litlka-i 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Case No. OZ\°iO | 4 l 2 F5> 
Judge Do h * 
4UG 1 9 2003 
I, (Th __, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been 
advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
I am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
CRIME & STATUTORY DEGREE 
PROVISION 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/MAX AND/OR 
MINIMUM MANDATORY 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
I have received a copy of the (Amende 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the 
guilty (or no contest). 
against me. I have read it, or had it 
cxf the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
044 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes.) 1 stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do no dispute or contest) that the 
following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally 
liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and 
prove Jhe elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
' "• o^
y
 k <i dsk to, G-\ (MihW i \ nl^J. r^ I 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under 
the constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no 
contest) I will give up all the following rights: 
COUNSEL: I know that 1 have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
might later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed lawyer's 
sendee to me. 
(have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I 
have dori^^a-krtowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
@) 045 
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). , j \ 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is V [7ffrf I f ( M ' ^ ^ 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, anMhe "consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
JURY TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if I were to 
have a jury trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against 
me and b) by attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity 
to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and 
testimony of the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State 
would pay those costs. 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I 
were to have a jury trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I 
chose not to testify, no on could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I 
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal 
to testily against me. 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead 
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the 
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and 
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must 
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, 
I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each 
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no 
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a 
mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fire, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. I 
also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one 
crime involved, the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run 
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime 
that 1 plead to. 1 also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another 
offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or 
no contest) piea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the Court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s)(is/are not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
I Or prtkV 
. <-- ^ - ^w- £7* "rz$ J 
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecution attorney are not binding 
on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the Judge 
may do are not binding on the Judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats or unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I understand its 
047 
contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am years of age. I have attended school through the jL^Sx^t. I can read and 
understand the English Language. If I do not understand English, an'inteipreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgement. 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I will be allowed to 
withdraw my plea only if I show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 
sentencing for any reason. 
DATED this \V day of jHrfyCU-** 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY, 
I certify that 1 am the attorney for
 m idCVl , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's 
criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other representations and 
declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are aetfurat^and true. 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
BARNO.Q<~7i-> 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that 
the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been offered 
defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which 
the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and base on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly, and 
voluntarily made. 
I T IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) 
set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
DATED this day of , 200 . 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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OGDEN, UTAH SEPTEMBER 8, 2 003 
MR. CAIKE: THE NEXT FATTER I HAVE 13 AARON HELBACH. 
THAT'S NUMBER 3 AND 4 ON THE CALENDAR. 
THE CLERK: FOR THE RECORD, STATE OF UTAH AARON LONNEL 
HELBACH, CASE NUMBER 031901411 AND 031901412, TIME SET FOR 
SENTENCING. 
MR. CAINS: JUDGE, THIS 13 MR. HELBACH. YOU'LL RECALL 
THAT BACK ON THE 18TH OF AUGUST, WE ENTERED INTO AN 
AGREEMENT. AGAIN, THE STATE RECOMMENDED CONCURRENT SENTENCES 
ON THAT, AND WE WERE JUST GONNA BE SENTENCED THAT DAY. BUT 
THE — THERE WAS SOME UNCLEARNESS ABOUT TWO THINGS. ONE WAS 
WHETHER THE VICTIMS WANTED TO SPEAK AND ALSO THE RESTITUTION 
ISSUE. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THERE ARE NO VICTIMS HERE TO 
SPEAK, 3UT WE DO HAVE A RESOLUTION OF THE RESTITUTION ISSUE. 
I'VE RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
WHICH -- ADDRESSED TO YOU, WHICH I'M ASSUMING YOU GCT, 
DELINEATING WHAT THE RESTITUTION FIGURE IS AND THE CASES THAT 
ARE APPLICABLE IN THIS COUNTY. AND WE ACCEPT THOSE FIGURES. 
THE COURT: ARE ANY OF THE VICTIMS IN THIS CASE PRESENT 
OR WISH TO BE HEARD? 
ALL RIGHT. JUST ONE PRELIMINARY MATTER: WHAT IS YOUR 
POSITION CONCERNING THE PEQUEST FOR $7 AN HOUR FOR THE ONE 
VICTIM — 
MR. CAINE: FOR THE WEEK? 
THE COURT: — FOR BEING OFF WORK FOR A WEEK? 
Ct 4 r\ 
MR. CAINE: WE BELIEVE THAT'S FAIR AND WOULD ACCEPT 
THAT. WE'VE ~ WE'RE ASSUMING — WE'RE NOT CERTAIN IF SEE 
WORKED A 4 0-HOUR WEEK, 3UT ASSUMING SHE DID, THAT WOULD EE 
$280, AND WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT BEING ENTERED. 
THE COURT: AND I'M GOING TO HAVE TO ASK TO REFRESH ME 
OF THE DETAILS OF THIS CASE BECAUSE AS I'VE READ THE 
PRESENTENCE THAT WAS PREPARED, THERE WAS JUST ONE STATEMENT 
STATING THAT THERE WERE — THERE WAS A GUN USED IN THESE 
CASES, AND IN THE DAVIS COUNTY CASE, IT WAS A KNIFE. BUT I 
FRANKLY DON'T RECALL EXACTLY WHAT THE STATE SAID LAST TIME WE 
WERE IN COURT AS TO WHAT WAS THE WEAPON USED — 
MR. PARMLEY: YOUR HONOR, IN CASE --
THE COURT: -- IN THESE TWO CHARGES. 
MR. PARMLEY: IN CASE 1412, THE VICTIM WAS A DEBBIE 
MAGUNE AT SINCLAIR. THERE WERE ACTUALLY TWO ROBBERIES AT THE 
SINCLAIR. 30TH TIMES DEBBIE MAGUNE WAS THE ONE WHO WAS THERE 
AND THE VICTIM OF THE ROBBERIES. ONE TIME HE USED OR 
THREATENED A KNIFE AND THE OTHER TIME HE USED OR THREATED A 
GUN, AS I RECALL. THEN IN CASE 1411, THE DEFENDANT WENT TO 
THE ARBY'S, AND IN THAT CASE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) THAT MYSELF 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) BRANDISHED A HANDGUN AND DEMANDED MONEY. 
THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. NOW, MR. CAINE, DO YOU 
WISH TO SPEAK TO SENTENCING? AGAIN, YOU'VE GOT TO KNOW I'M 
CONSIDERING IT CONSECUTIVE OR CONCURRENT HERE, CONCERNED 
ABOUT IT, EVEN THOUGH THE RECOMMENDATION IS THAT THEY RUN 
4 
CONCURRENT. 
MR. CAINS: I THINK I'VE -- AGAIN, MY UNDERSTANDING THAT 
THE REASON THIS WAS CONTINUED OVER WAS NOT FOR YOU TO 
CONSIDER THAT. IT WAS BECAUSE THERE WAS SOKE CONCERN THAT 
THE VICTIM DIDN'T GET A CHANCE TO SPEAK BECAUSE WE WERE DOING 
61 IT THAT DAY. THAT'S HAPPENED, WE'VE RESOLVED THE 
7 RESTITUTION — 
8 THE COURT: WELL, I'LL TELL YOU NOW, IT'S MY CONCERN. 
9 MR. CAIKE: I THINK ~ I THINK THEY SHOULD RUN 
10 CONCURRENT. THAT'S THE AGREEMENT WE MALE. I THINK UNDER THE 
11 CIPCUMSTANCES OF ALL OF THIS THAT FAPTICULARIY WITH THE DAVIS 
12 COUNTY CASE AND EVERYTHING, THAT EVEN CONCURRENT SENTENCES 
12| WILL OBVIOUSLY RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TIME ON 
14 1 THESE KINDS OF CASES. BUT THAT'S APPRCPPIATE. 
THE COURT: MR. HELBACH, DO YOU WISH TO SPEAK? 
.61 MR. EEL3ACH: YES, YOUR HONCR. I'VE HAD PLENTY OF TIME 
17 TO THINK ABOUT WHAT I'VE DONE AND, QUITE FRANKLY, IT REALLY 
18 IS UP TO YOU WHETHER THESE CHAPGES APE CONCURRENT OR 
19 CONSECUTIVE. I KNEW WHAT I WAS DOING WAS WRONG AND I DID IT 
2 0 ANYWAY. AND THEPE'S NOTHING I CAN DO PEALLY TO TAKE THAT 
21 BACK NOW. BEYOND THAT, I DON'T REALLY KNOW WHAT ELSE TO SAY. 
22 THE COURT: WELL, IN YOUR STATEMENT, MP. HELBACH, YOU 
22 SEEM TO KIND OF SHIFT THE BUPDEN AND RESPONSIBILITY ABOUT 
24 WHETHER OR NOT YOU CAN BELIEVE ANYONE AND WHETHER OR NOT 
251 SOCIETY IS PEPHAPS THE CAUSE OF ALL THIS AND — AND REAL 
^ J- V ~ J **$%.^+7 
STPANGE RATIONALE THAT I READ INTO IT PERHAPS, BUT AT LEAST 
CAUSED ME SOME CONCERN. IN OTHER WORDS, WHICH SIDE OF THE 
FENCE DO YOU WANT TO EE ON. ARE COPS HERS TO PROTECT AND 
SERVE THE PROTECTED OR THE HUNTED. I QUESTION EVEPYTHING. 
AND I WAS WONDEPING WHY YOU MADE THAT STATEMENT. 
MR. HELBACH: QUITS FRANKLY, WHEN I WAS 11 YEARS OLD, MY 
FATHER WAS KILLED BY A POLICE OFFICER AND THAT — THAT 
CHANGED MY VIEWS TOWARDS COPS FOR A LONG TIME. AND WHAT I 
MEANT IN THAT STATEMENT WAS BEING LOCKED UP AND SEEING — 
REALIZING WHERE I COULD HAVE CHANGED THINGS DUPING THE TIMES 
WHEN I WAS COMMITTING MY CRIMES, I COULD HAVE GONE TO THE 
POLICE AND ASKED FOR HELP. I COULD HAVE GONE TO SOMEBODY AND 
GOTTEN HELP WITH MY SITUATION BECAUSE I WAS IN SOME TROUBLE. 
AND I DIDN'T BECAUSE OF WHAT HAPPENED WHEN I WAS 11 YEARS 
OLD. BUT WHAT I MEANT WITH THAT STATEMENT WAS, BEING LOCKED 
UP AND THE EXPEPIENCES I'VE GONE THROUGH FOR THE LAST FIVE OR 
SIX MONTHS, I'VE LEARNED TO QUESTION AND I'M STAPTING TO COME 
AROUND AND REALIZE THAT THINGS APEN'T PEALLY THE WAY THAT I 
BELIEVED THEY WERE. 
THE COURT: DIDN'T YOU TALK ABOUT THAT SORT OF PROBLEM 
WHEN YOU WERE IN 0. AND A. FOR 91 EAYS AS A JUVENILE? 
MR. HELBACH: I WAS NEVER IN 0. AND A. FOR — 
THE COURT: WEREN'T YOU IN 0. AND A.? 
MR. HEL3ACH: NO, THERE'S — THERE'S A -- I WENT OVER 
AND — 
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IT'S THE SENTENCE OF THIS COURT THAT YOU SERVE TWO TERMS 
OF FIVE YEARS TO LIFE AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON, ONE ON EACH 
OF THE FIRST DEGREE FELONIES. HOWEVEP, I WILL CRDER THAT 
THEY RUN CONCURRENT WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH THE DAVIS COUNTY 
FELONY. 
MR. CAINS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: AND I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT YOU PAY 
RESTITUTION OF $801 ON THE ARBY'S CASS AND $299 PLUS TWO 
HUNDRED AND — 
MR. CAINS: EIGHTY. 
MR. PARMLEY: — EIGHTY DOLLARS IN RESTITUTION. THAT 
2 80 IS TO MRS. MAGUNE. IN THE EVENT ANY OF THESE VICTIMS DO 
ENGAGE IN COUNSELING, ALSO GOING TO ORDER THAT YOU PAY THEIR 
COUNSELING COSTS EECAUSE YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE THAT THEY RAY 
BE TERRORIZED EVEN TO LEAVE THEIR APARTMENTS NOW, SO — OR 
THEIR HOMES BECAUSE OF YOUR MISCONDUCT. BUT THAT WILL BE 
RESERVED FOR THE BOARD OF PARDONS TO DETERMINE IN THE EVENT 
SOMETHING LIKE THAT HAPPENS. 
I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU NEW TIME -- CREDITS FOR TIME 
SERVED OR GOOD TIME OBVIOUSLY IN THIS CASE. THAT'S ALL. 
MR. CAINS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. EEL3ACH: THANK YOU. 
£ fZ.~s £ » * & ; 3 : <££. '. S*» t - ' i l t 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) S3 
COUNTY OF WEBER) 
THIS I S TO CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING SEVEN PAGES OF 
TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTE A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY A3 A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH. 
DATED AT OGDEN, UTAH THIS 17TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2 0 0 7 . 
|J&V\(| Uf( 
DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
r ! l Q 
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THE COURT: Yes, I will. 
MS. 3EAT0N: We'll be dismissing case ending in 1413 
and the defendant will be pleading to case ending 1412 and 
1411. 
THE CLERK: Thank you. 
MR. CAINS: That is correct. 
THE COURT: All right. Now — 
MR. CAINE: As far as -- I guess we probably ought 
to -- since this hasn't been raised before, as far as the 
restitution goes since I don't — at least Mr. Farmley didn't 
indicate there had been any claim, I suppose what you can do 
is leave that for the Board cf Pardons to determine. 
THE COURT: We can address that. 
MR. CAINE: Yeah. 
THE COURT: But first then, so that we're clear on 
the elements under the most recent case from the Court of 
Appeals, we have to be very detailed on the elements. And 
I'll go over those again which may be somewhat duplicating 
what's in this written agreement but I want you to clearly 
understand what you're pleading to, what the elements are, 
and so I'm going to go over them witn some more detail. 
I'll ask first on the case of February the 14th on case 
number 1411, and that's the Arby's case, what would the 
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All right. 
September the 8th then. 
That will be fine. 
All right. Thank you. All right. 
(The matter concluded.) 
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State v. Helbach 
Utah App.,2004. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Aaron L. HELBACH, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20040671-CA. 
Oct. 28, 2004. 
Second District, Ogden Department; The 
Honorable Roger S. Dutson. 
Aaron L. Helbach, Gunnison, Appellant 
Pro Se. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and 
ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
ft[l]*l AaronHelbach appeals the trial 
court's denial of his motion to be 
resentenced. This is before the court on the 
State's motion for summary disposition 
based on lack of jurisdiction. 
fl[2] Helbach pleaded guilty to a charge of 
aggravated robbery in August 2003. Helbach 
completed a statement in support of his 
guilty plea, giving the factual basis for his 
plea and waiving specific rights, including 
his right to appeal. The document also 
specified that he could withdraw his plea 
only on good cause shown, and that he must 
file a motion to withdraw his plea before the 
announcement of sentence. Helbach was 
sentenced in September 2003. 
[f 3] In March 2004, Helbach filed a motion 
for resentencing in the trial court in his 
criminal case. Helbach asserted that he was 
incompetent at the time of his plea, and thus 
the plea was invalid. The trial court denied 
the motion on its merits, finding there was 
no indication that Helbach was not fully 
capable of entering a knowing and voluntary 
plea, and that the mental evaluation from the 
State did not indicate any disorder that 
would impact his competency. The trial 
court also noted the motion was filed several 
months after sentencing, but did " not 
address [the] timeliness of the Motion." 
[^ [4] Helbach asserts that his motion was 
filed u under the philosophy" of State v. 
Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d llOxert. 
granted J i P.3d 946 (Utah 2003), which 
permitted a defendant to file a motion for 
resentencing in the sentencing court under 
particular circumstances. Helbach has 
apparently seized on Rees to avoid going 
through the procedures for post-conviction 
relief as set forth in the Utah Post-
Conviction Remedies Act (Act), Utah Code 
sections 78-35a-101 to -304 (2002), and 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. 
However, after Rees, this court has held that 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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Page 2 
requests to be resentenced to permit a 
renewal of an opportunity to appeal fall 
squarely within rule 65C and the Act. See 
State v Manning. 2004 LT App 87.c 21. 89 
P.3d \96xert. grant ed,2004 Utah LEXIS 
172(UtahAug. 11,2004). 
[^ f5] Additionally, Helbach has not shown 
that he comes within the scope of Rees In 
Rees, this court held that extraordinary relief 
may be available in the sentencing court if a 
defendant has been denied the effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. See Rees, 
2003 UT App 4 at T 6. Such relief, however, 
is available only in u limited circumstances, 
to modify or vacate a judgment where extra-
record facts show that the defendant has 
been deprived of his constitutional right to a 
fair trial or meaningful appeal." Id at f^ 
13.Helbach waived his right to a trial and 
appeal by pleading guilty and does not come 
within the narrow scope of Rees 
[%6] Instead, Helbach's motion is governed 
by Utah Code section 77-13-6, providing for 
the methods of challenging a guilty plea. 
Section 77-13-6 provides that a guilty plea " 
may be withdrawn only upon leave of the 
court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made." Utah 
Code Ann. $ 77-13-6(7 )f a) (2003). A 
request to withdraw a plea ** shall be made 
by motion before sentence is announced." 
IJ_ § 77-13-6(2)(b). If a defendant does not 
timely request to withdraw his plea, any 
challenge to the plea must be made pursuant 
to rule 65C and the Act. See [d_ § 77-13-
6(2)(c). 
fl[7] *2 Helbach's motion requested 
resentencing, but attacked the validity of his 
plea, arguing he was incompetent. The trial 
court addressed the merits, finding that 
Helbach was not incompetent at his plea. 
The trial court also noted, but did not rule 
on, the late filing of the motion. In 
substance, Helbach's motion was a motion to 
withdraw his plea, and the trial court 
considered it as such. However, under 
section 77-13-6, the trial court had no 
jurisdiction to consider the motion because it 
was made months after sentence was 
announced. Section 77-13-6 limits a 
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea to 
the time before the announcement of 
sentence. See id_ § 77-13-6(2)(b). " 
Thereafter, the right is extinguished." State 
v. Abeyta, 852 P2d 993. 995 (Utah 1993) 
(holding that failure to file a timely motion 
for withdrawal extinguishes the right). The 
timely filing of a notice to withdraw a plea 
is jurisdictional. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 
13>13-4,40P.3d630. 
[^ |8] The trial court lacked jurisdiction over 
Helbach's motion, and thus this court 
likewise lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. 
See State v Mont ova, 825 P.2d 676. 678-79 
(Utah Ct.App.lQ91). 
appeal is dismissed. 
Accordingly, this 
Utah App..2004. 
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Helbach v. Dutson 
Utah App.,2004. 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK 
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aaron L. HELBACH, Petitioner, 
v. 
Judge Roger DUTSON, Mark DeCaria, and 
State of Utah, Respondents. 
No. 20040947-CA. 
Dec. 16,2004. 
Original Proceeding in this Court. 
Aaron L. Helbach, Gunnison, Petitioner 
Pro Se. 
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent Judge Dutson. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christopher D. 
Ballard, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
State of Utah. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and 
GREENWOOD. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For 
Official Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
[f 1] *1 Aaron Helbach filed a petition in the 
appellate courts seeking extraordinary relief 
under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 19 
and seeking habeas corpus relief under Utah 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 20. 
fl[2] Helbach's petition challenges the 
validity of his guilty plea to charges of 
aggravated robbery. Helbach pleaded guilty 
in August 2003 and was sentenced in 
September 2003. He did not file a timely 
motion to withdraw his plea. SeeUtah Code 
Ann. $ 77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (providing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be 
made before sentence is announced). As a 
result, his sole avenue to challenge his plea 
is under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
(Act), seeUtah Code sections 78-35a-101 to 
-110, and rule 65C of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. SeeUtah Code Ami. $ 77-
13-6(2)(c). 
HJ3] Under rule 19 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, a petition for 
extraordinary relief in an appellate court is 
available only where " no other plain, 
speedy, or adequate remedy exists." Utah 
RApp. P. 19(b)(4); see alsoUtah R. Civ. P. 
65B. Helbach has a plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy to challenge his plea under 
the procedures of the Act and rule 65C. 
Thus, to the extent Helbach's petition is a 
petition for extraordinary relief under rule 
19, it is denied. 
[f4] Rule 20 provides that where a petition 
for habeas corpus relief is filed in an 
appellate court, the petition " will be 
referred to the appropriate district court." 
Utah R.App. P. 20(a). The referral is 
required u unless it is shown on the face of 
the petition to the satisfaction of the 
appellate court that the district court is 
unavailable or other exigent circumstances 
exist." Id. Helbach's petition does not 
address this requirement at all. He alleges no 
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facts that would show the una\ ailability of 
the district court or other exigent 
circumstances warranting the retention of 
the petition in an appellate court. As a result, 
insofar as the petition is a petition for habeas 
corpus or post-conviction relief, the petition 
is not appropriately before this court. 
[Tf5] Accordingly, the petition for 
extraordinary relief is denied. Further, the 
petition is referred to the second district 
court for consideration regarding the claims 
for post-conviction relief. 
Utah App..2004. 
Helbach v. Dutson 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 83G4TP QF J JXA^ . 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT ^ 
AARON HELBACH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
" • - " w L - i L,LUn] 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 631901411 rS 
Honorable Ro?er S. Dutson 
MAY 1 8 2006 
When the Petitioner filed a petition challenging the validity of his guilty plea, this Court 
summarily dismissed it after a review of the record showed that the Petitioner's claims were 
w ithout merit. Subsequently, the Petitioner asked for reconsideration arguing that the law does 
not allow a review of the record or the merits of a petitioner's claims at this stage of the 
proceedings. Because the Court finds that the Petitioner's arguments are valid, the previous 
order dismissing the petition is vacated. 
Upon receiving a petition for post conviction relief, a court must summarily dismiss 
claims when, based solely on the pleading's allegations, it appears that the facts alleged do not 
support a claim for relief as a matter of law. or that the claim has no arguable basis in fact. Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(g). The court will review only the information contained in this petition. 
I. Elements of Aggravated Robbery 
The Petitioner alleges that he was not told that the elements of aggravated robbery 
included: (1) a taking, (2) of personal property, (3) from a person or in his immediate presence, 
Ruling and Order 
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and (4) a positive identification by the victim. A defendant must be informed of the elements of 
the charge before a court ma}' accept a guilty plea. State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585. 592 (Utah 
2005). The aggravated robbery statute in effect at the time the Petitioner committed the crime 
states that "[a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he . . . 
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601. . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-301 (2003). The robbery statute states that, "[a] person commits robbery if. . . the 
person unlawfully and intentionalh takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession 
of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or 
fear. . . /" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003). Clearly, the statute includes the elements of (1) a 
taking. (2) of personal property. (3) from a person or in his immediate presence, so the 
Petitioner's claim that his plea was not voluntary because he was not advised of these elements, 
is not facially frivolous. That issue will be forwarded to the Utah State Attorney General's 
Office for review. However, a positive identification by a victim, is not an element of aggravated 
robbery, so this claim is summarily dismissed as facially frivolous. 
II. How the Facts Constitute The Crime 
The Petitioner alleges that he was not told how the facts of his case constitute the crime 
charged. "Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, 
it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts." State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1984). The Petitioner has 
at least stated a possible cause of action, so that issue will be forwarded to the Attorney General's 
Office for review. 
III. Bifurcated Procedure 
Ruling and Order 
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The Petitioner asserts that his plea was not knowing, because no one explained that 
pro\ ing aggravated robbery was a bifurcated procedure requiring proof of robbery before 
aggravated robbery. He states that had he known that the Prosecutor had to prove that he took 
personal property from a person by means of force or fear, he would not have entered into a 
guilt) plea, because these elements require some proof that he was at the scene. It is not clear 
which of the following three probable claims the Petitioner is making. 
If the Petitioner means to state a claim that his plea was unknowing, because he did not 
know that a conviction for an aggravated crime is done in a bifurcated procedure, he has stated a 
facially frivolous claim. The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court has not found, any 
support for this proposition, and the Court concludes that this information is not required. The 
Court finds support for its conclusion in State v. Corwell 114 P.3d 569 (Utah 2005). In Corwell 
the defendant argued that the court's duty under Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Rule 11(e)) to advise her that her right to appeal wras limited, meant that the court must explain 
numerous appeal issues. The Supreme Court of Utah observed that nothing in the plain language 
of Rule 11(e) required such a detailed explanation. The Supreme Court also referenced. State v. 
Visser. 22 P.3d 1242 (Utah 2000), where it held that a trial court was not required to explain 
e\ ery aspect of the right to a speedy trial. Consequent!}, the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant was not entitled to an explanation of every aspect of the right to appeal. The Court 
concludes that requiring a trial court to explain the bifurcated procedure used in a conviction for 
an aggravated offense is tantamount to requiring a court to provide a detailed explanation of 
appellate issues. Therefore, the Court summaril) dismisses this claim. 
The second possible claim the Petitioner could be making is that he v,as not ad^ ised of 
Ruling and Order 
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every element of the crime. This claim echos the Petitioner's first claim, but it alleges that none 
of the elements were explained. This claim will be forwarded to the Utah State Attorney 
General's Office. 
The third possible claim the Petitioner could be making is that his plea was unknowing, 
because he was not advised that the State must prove every element of the crime. As stated 
before, a defendant must be ad\ ised of the consequences of his guilty plea. .See, State v. Merrill 
114 P.3d 585, 592 (Utah 2005). Therefore, this claim will be forwarded to the Office of the Utah 
State Attorney General for review. 
IV. Ability to Withdraw Guilty Plea and the Right to Appeal 
The Petitioner has included two different paragraphs which contain contradictory 
statements regarding whether the Court made mistakes when advising him about Ins right to 
appeal and his right to withdraw his guilty plea. In his second paragraph he states Jhat he was 
never advised of his right to withdraw his guilty plea or his right to appeal. However, in his first 
paragraph, he states that the plea agreement incorrectly advised him that he had thirty days from 
the entry of a plea to withdraw his plea. Further, the Petitioner argues that the law allows the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea upon a showing of good cause or exceptional circumstances, or by 
using a petition for post conviction relief. Finally, the Petitioner states that he would like to 
assert his right to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11(f). 
The failure to inform a defendant of the right to appeal can constitute a denial of the right 
to appeal. See, Manning v. State, 122 P.3d 628, 636 (Utah 2005). Therefore, the Petitioner has 
stated a claim for relief, and the Court will forward this claim to the Attorney General's Office 
for review. 
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Before addressing the Petitioner's claims related to his ability to withdraw a guilty plea, 
the Court notes that withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a right. State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 280 
(Utah 2004). To the extent that the Petitioner means to assert a claim that his right to withdraw 
his guilty plea was violated, he has stated a facially frivolous claim which is summarily 
dismissed. The Court will address the Petitioner's arguments assuming that he means to assert a 
claim that he was not advised of his ability to seek withdrawal of his guilty plea. 
If the Petitioner is claiming that he never was informed of his ability to withdraw his 
guilty plea, he has stated facially frivolous claim. To state a claim in a petition for post 
conviction relief, the basis for that relief must be one, such as a constitutional violation, listed in 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Pleading a violation of one of the prophylactic 
provisions of Rule 11(e) is insufficient. Salazar v. Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993). 
The only possible constitutional violation implicated by this issue is whether the failure to advise 
the defendant of the ability to withdraw a guilty plea renders the plea unknowing or involuntary. 
The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court's review of many cases, has not revealed any 
support for such an assertion. Two case which addresses this issue suggest to the contrary. In 
State v. Dean, 95 P.3d 276, 280 (Utah 2004), the Supreme Court of Utah stated that withdrawal 
o[ a guilty plea is not a right, it is a privilege which may be granted upon a show ing of good 
cause In State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585 (Utah 2005). the Supreme Court of Utah stated that the 
right to seek withdrawal of a guilty plea is not subject to constitutional protections. Because 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not a right, it is unlikely that the failure to advise a defendant that 
he can seek withdrawal of his guilty plea renders the plea unknowing. Further, Rule 11(f) states 
the failure to ad\ ise a defendant of the time limits in which he may make a motion to withdraw a 
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guilt} plea, is not a basis to set the plea aside. Given the lack of support for the Petitioner's 
position, and the strongly suggesth e language in the cases and Rule 11(f). the Court concludes 
that a defendant does not have the constitutional right to be advised of his ability to pursue the 
withdrawal of his guilty plea. Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
If the Petitioner is claiming that his guilty plea should be vacated, because he was 
incorrectly told of the time limits for withdrawing his guilt} plea under State \ Ostler. 31 P.3d 
528 (Utah 2001), his claim is facially frivolous. Ostler interpreted a statute which allowed a 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea up to thirty days after its entry. Since Ostler, this time limit 
has been changed. This amendment w7as in effect when the Petitioner committed the crimes and 
entered his plea. Therefore, the Court summarily dismisses this claim. 
Petitioner also claims that any statement which gives a time limit for withdrawing a guilty 
plea is an incorrect statement of the law7. The Petitioner cites to State v Marvin, 964 P 2d 313, 
318 (Utah 1998) to demonstrate that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of 
good cause or exceptional circumstances. He also notes that withdrawal can be done by using a 
petition for post com iction relief. If this is a separate claim for relief, it repeats the Petitioner's 
claim that he was incorrectly advised of the time limits to withdraw his guilt} plea. Therefore, it 
is summarily dismissed as faciall} frholous. 
The final issue in this claim, is whether the Petitioner may assert his "right"' under Rule 
11 (f) to make a motion to set aside his guilty plea, because he was incorrectly informed about the 
time limits for making such a motion. However, the Petitioner has not submitted a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, the Court dismisses this claim as frholous. 
V. Conditional Guilty Pleas and Incompetency 
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The Petitioner's next claim is also unclear. He firsts states that his plea was unknowing, 
because he was not advised of his right to enter into a conditional guilty plea. Then, he makes 
multiple allegations regarding his competency. First, he was evaluated for mental incompetency 
after a conviction in Davis County but before his guilty plea in Weber. Second, the evaluation 
stated that he did not suffer from any serious mental disorder at that time. Third, he was not 
competent to make a confession. Fourth, when his lawyer saw the report, he incorrectly advised 
him to plead guilty, because the Petitioner had confessed. The Petitioner claims this advise was 
unsound, because his attorney should have been looking at his competency at the time he 
confessed. Fifth, the Petitioner alleges that the Court made several procedural errors in assessing 
his competency, because (1) the Court did not order another evaluation by the Department of 
Human Sendees which the Petitioner claims is required by 77-15 et. seq.; and (2) the Court 
incorrectly stated that he was competent without ever holding a hearing or getting an evaluation 
by mental experts: and (3) the Court was incorrect in its assessment of competency, because his 
mental disorder was worse than in several other cases which the Petitioner cites; and finally, the 
petitioner alleges that he did not know what was going on in the courtroom, because he suffers 
from bipolar disorder. 
The Petitioner could be making several possible claims: (1) the Petitioner was entitled to 
be adA ised of the right to enter a conditional guilty plea (he would have used that right to exclude 
his confession and contest his competency to stand trial); (2) his plea was unknowing, because he 
was not advised of his right to enter a conditional guilty plea; (3) he was incompetent at the time 
he confessed, so using his confession to obtain a guilty plea is illegal (this claim was made in this 
petition); (4) the Petitioner was incompetent at the time he entered a guilty plea, so his guilty plea 
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was unknowing; or (5) the Petitioner was too incompetent to enter an} type of plea (this claim 
was made in this petition). Again, the Court will address each possibility in turn. 
The first two of these possible claims are based on the incorrect assumption that a 
defendant has the right to be informed of the ability to enter a conditional guilty plea and/or he 
had the right to enter a conditional guilty plea. Based on the following analysis, the Court 
dismisses the first two possible claims as facially frivolous. 
The Petitioner has not provided, and the Court cannot find, any support for the 
proposition that a defendant has the right to be informed of the ability to enter a conditional 
guilt)7 plea, and the Court concludes that it is not required to inform a defendant of this option. 
The purpose of Rule 11(e). which lists the rights of which a defendant must be informed, is to 
ensure that a defendant's plea is voluntary and hwMing. See, State v Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108, 
1111 (Utah 2000) (emphasis added). The ability of a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea 
is not one of these rights listed in rule 1 l(e)-it is listed in Rule 1 l(i). Therefore, the Court 
concludes that it is not required to advise a defendant of the possibility of entering a conditional 
plea, before a defendant's plea can be characterized as voluntary. 
Also, the Court concludes that the Petitioner does not have the right to enter such a plea. 
Rule 1 l(i), which lists the conditions under which a court may accept a conditional guilty plea, 
states that a defendant can only enter a conditional guilty plea if the prosecutor consents, and the 
court approves. The plain language of Rule 1 l(i) demonstrates that the ability to enter a 
conditional guilty plea is a privilege-not a right. This conclusion is supported by State v 
Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108 (Utah 2000). In Gamblin, the Supreme Court of Utah concluded that 
withdrawal of a guilty plea was a privilege not a right, because the plain language of the statute 
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stated that withdrawal was conditioned on court approval. The rule allowing the entry of a 
conditional guilty plea, also conditions this ability on court approval. Therefore, the Court 
concludes that the ability to enter a conditional guilty plea is not a right. 
The Petitioner's next possible claim is that he was incompetent when he gave his 
confession, so it should have been excluded. The Petitioner apparently presumes that exclusion 
of the confession would mean that it could not be used by his attorney to encourage him to plead 
guilty or by the prosecution as a basis for the guilty plea. "[B]y pleading guilty, the defendant. . 
.waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations/' State 
v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). Whether a confession can be used due to a 
defendant's incompetency is a pre-plea constitutional issue. Therefore, this claim is frivolous 
and summarily dismissed. 
The Petitioner's claim, that his attorney should not have considered his confession when 
recommending the plea bargain, is one for ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed in an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must at least allege that counsel's 
performance fell below professionally competent assistance, and but for counsel's deficient 
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding's results would have been 
different. Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 690-694 (1984). While the Petitioner failed 
to allege prejudice, the Petitioner's claim is sufficient for the review of the Attorney General. 
Finally, the Petitioner claims that the prosecutor established a basis for his guilty plea by 
inappropriately using evidence obtained by engaging in unconstitutional behavior. The Petitioner 
did not provide, and the Court's review of many cases did not reveal, any support for his 
assertion. Therefore, the Court summarily dismisses this claim as frivolous. 
Ruling and Order 
Helbach vs. State 
Case No. 031901411 FS 
Pane 9 of 16 
The last of the Petitioner's possible claims allege that he was incompetent at the time he 
was entered his guilty plea. "It is well established that due process requires that a defendant be 
mentally competent to plead guilt} and to stand trial/' State v. Arguelles. 63 P.3d 73 L 745 (Utah 
2003). Because the Petitioner made allegations which facially support these last claims for relief, 
the Court wall forward both of them to the Attorney General's Office for response. 
As part of these claims the Court wall forward the Petitioner's claims that the Court did 
not correctly follow the procedure to establish whether the Petitioner wras competent-including 
the Petitioner's claims that the Court decided competency without a hearing or getting an 
e\ aiuation completed by mental experts. However,-the Court wall not address the Petitioner's 
claim that he had the right to have his competency evaluated by the Department of Human 
Services (DHS) as stated in 77-15, et. seq., because (1) the Petitioner had undergone a recent 
DHS e^  aiuation which was provided to this Court and (2) the Petitioner did not have this right. 
The on!) reference to DHS performing a competency e\ aiuation in the statutes cited by the 
Petitioner is in 77-15-5(2)(a) which states; fcw[a]fter the granting of a petition and prior to a full 
competency hearing, the court may order the Department of Human Sendees to examine the 
person and to report to the court concerning the defendant's mental condition. Utah Code Ann. 
77-15-5(2)(a) (emphasis added). Because an evaluation by DHS is discretionary, die Court is not 
required to pro\ ide an additional evaluation The Court dismisses this part of the Petitioner's 
claim as facially frh olous. 
VI. Explanation of Possible Punishments for the Charged Crime 
The Petitioner also claims that his plea wras unknowing, because he did not receive an 
adequate explanation of the punishment which would be imposed. The Petitioner states that: (1) 
Ruling and Order 
Helbach \s . State 
Case No. 031901411 PS 
Page 10 of 16 
217 
the Court did not explain that he would have to be in prison for at least five years before he 
would be eligible for parole: (2) the Court did not explain that he could be imprisoned for life; 
(3) the Court did not explain that the matrix calculation in the pre-sentencing investigation report 
(PSI) was not binding; and (4) the Court did not explain that it relinquished jurisdiction to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole after sentencing. Due process requires that a court explain the 
consequences of a guilty plea. .See, State v. Merrill 114 P.3d 585, 592 (Utah 2005). A Court 
must explain the minium and maximum punishment for a crime when taking a guilty plea, so the 
Court will forward the first two claims to the Utah State Attorney Generals office for response. 
However, the Court has no obligation to discuss the PSI matrix as that is only advisory to the 
Court, and the Court need not explain that it relinquishes jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons 
and Parole as that is done by statute. These later two claims are dismissed as facially frivolous. 
VII. Rights Which Are Waived Upon Pleading Guilty 
Nexlt the Petitioner states that the Court failed to ensure that he understood all of the 
rights he was waiving. However, the Petitioner does not state of which right the Court did not 
advise him. Because, this mere allegation is not enough to state a claim, the Court summarily 
dismisses this claim as frivolous on its face. 
VIII. Strict Compliance With Rule 11(e) 
Next, die Petitioner states that the Court failed to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) when 
taking his guilty plea. The Petitioner does not state whether this allegation is a claim or is a 
factual allegation to support his claim that his plea was not voluntaiy and knowing. The failure 
to strictly comply with Rule 11(e) is not a basis to vacate a plea pursuant to a petition for post-
conviction relief. See, Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993)(a petitioner must 
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show a violation of his constitutional rights which made his/her plea unknowing or involuntary). 
However, the Petitioner has alleged facts important enough to forward this claim to the Attorney 
General for review. 
IX. Evidence Supporting the Charge of Aggravated Robbery 
The Petitioner attacks the evidence in his case by making the following claims: (1) intent 
wras not proven; (2) there was no evidence that he committed the crime; (3) his co-defendants had 
motive to implicate him: and (4) his confession was incompetent "[B]y pleading guilty, the 
defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged . . . / ' 
State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275. 1278 (Utah 1989). The Petitioner waived his right to require the 
state to prove all of the elements of aggravated robbery when he entered a guilty plea. Therefoie, 
the Court summarily dismisses this claim as facially frivolous. 
X. Insufficient Factual Basis to Support the Petitioner's Guilty Plea 
The Petitioner claims that the insufficient factual basis provided for his guilt} plea 
violated his due process rights and the prosecutor's ethical duty. A violation of a prosecutor's 
ethical duty is an insufficient allegation to support a motion to vacate a guilty plea Therefore, 
this claim is summarily dismissed. However, failing to make a record of facts sufficient to 
support a guilty plea is a violation of a defendant's due process rights. Willett v. Barnes. 842 
P.2d 860. 862 (Utah 1992). Therefore, the Petitioner's claim is facially sufficient so it will be 
forwarded to the Utah State Attorney General's Office for evaluation. 
XI. Inaccuracies Contained in the Pre-Sentencing Investigation Report 
The Petitioner also contends that he was unable to contest inaccuracies in his Pre-
sentencing Investigation Report (PSI), because he never received a cop)7. Due process requires 
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that a defendant be provided with information being relied on by the Court for sentencing. State 
v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982). Therefore, the Petitioner has stated a facially sufficient 
claim for relief and the Court will forward it to the Office of the Attorney General. 
XII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel, listing approximately 
25 reasons why his attorney's performance was deficient. To succeed on a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must allege that counsel's performance fell below 
professional!} competent assistance, and but for counsel's deficient performance, there is a 
reasonable probability that the proceeding's results would have been different. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-694 (1984). Although the Petitioner failed to allege how these 
deficiencies prejudiced him, it is an issue sufficient to refer to the Attorney General for response. 
XIIL Sufficiency of the Evidence and Vagueness 
The Petitioner alleges that the behavior of which he is accused does not satisfy the 
elements of the aggravated robbery statute. First, the statute requires an intentional taking. The 
Petitioner asserts that this element requires proof of his identity-something which did not happen 
in this case. Second, the Petitioner states that robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of 
personal property from their person or in his immediate presence by means of force or fear. The 
Petitioner references Black's Law Dictionary to show that the definition of'"personal" means 
"pertaining to and limited to a person/' The Petitioner uses his version of the robbery statute and 
his definition of'"personaP to argue that the statute requires that the property which is taken, 
must be taken from the person who owns it. Since the property taken, in the robberies of which 
the Petitioner was convicted was owned by the store (not b) the employees from whom it was 
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taken), the Petitioner argues that he is not guilty. Finally, the Petitioner, in an implicit 
acknowledgment that his argument hinges on his definition of personal, states that if someone 
can provide a different definition of "personal," the statute is unconstitutionally \ague. 
The Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea should be \ acated, because the Slate did not 
provide proof of his identity is facially frivolous. tfc[B]y pleading guilt}*, the defendant is deemed 
to ha\ e admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged. . . ."' State v Parsons. 781 
P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989). When the Petitioner pleaded guilty, he admitted all essential 
elements of the crime. Therefore, this claim is summarily dismissed. 
The Petitioner's argument that the property taken must be owned by the person from 
whom it is taken is facially frivolous. The robbeiy statute in effect at the time of the Petitioner's 
conviction reads, "[a] person commits robbeiy if. . . the person unlawfully and intentionally 
takes or attempts to take personal propert) in the possession of another from his person, or 
immediate presence, against his will, by means of force or fear. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 
(2003). The statute clearly outlaws the taking of personal propeity (propeity owned b} a person) 
from a person who has possession of it. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim is summarily 
dismissed. Because the Court was able to resolve the Petitioner's claim without providing a 
different definition of "personal property,'* the Court will not address the Petitioner's 
constitutional vagueness argument. 
ORDER 
The following claims of the Petitioner are dismissed as facially frivolous. 
1- There was no positive identification of the Petitioner by a victim as the statute requires. 
2- The Petitioner wTas not advised of the bifurcated procedure used in aggravated crimes. 
3- The Petitioner was denied his right to withdraw his guilty plea. 
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4- The Petitioner was never informed of his ability to withdraw his guilty plea. 
5- The Petitioner was incorrectly told of the time limits for withdrawing his guilty plea. 
6- A guilt}7 plea may be withdrawn upon a showing of good cause or plain error or by a 
petition for post conviction relief. 
7- The Petitioner's should have been told of his right to enter a conditional guilty plea. 
8- The Petitioner's plea was unknowing, because he was not advised of his right to enter a 
conditional guilty plea. 
9- The Petitioner's confession should have been excluded, because he was incompetent. 
10- The Prosecutor violated the Petitioner's rights when he/she used the Petitioner's 
confession, obtained in violation of the constitutional as a factual basis for the guilty 
plea. 
11 - The Court should have ordered an evaluation by the Department of Human Services. 
12-The Court did not explain that the matrix calculation in the pre-sentencing 
investigation report was not binding 
13-The Court did not explain it relinquishes jurisdiction to the Board of Pardons and 
Parole after sentencing. 
14- The Court did not inform the Petitioner of all of the rights which he was waiving. 
15- The evidence is insufficient to prove every element of aggravated robbery including 
intent. 
16- The prosecutor violated his/her ethical duty to insure that there was sufficient 
evidence to charge the Petitioner with aggravated robbery. 
17- The Prosecutor did not establish an intentional taking or a positive identification of 
the Petitioner. 
18- The aggravated robbery statute requires proof that the property, taken during the 
robber}', was owned by the person from whom it was taken. 
The following claims by the Petitioner are not facially frivolous. 
1- The Petitioner was not told that the elements of aggravated robbery include a taking, of 
personal property, from a person or in his immediate presence. 
2- The Petitioner's plea was not informed of how the law related to the facts. 
3-The Petitioner was not advised of every element of the crime. 
4- The Petitioner was not advised that the State had the burden of proving every element 
of the crime. 
5- The Petitioner was not informed of the right to appeal. 
6- The Petitioner's attorney should not have considered his confession in deciding to 
recommend that the Petitioner plead guilty. 
7- The Petitioner's guilty plea was unknowing, because was incompetent at the time he 
entered the guilty plea. 
8- The Petitioner was so incompetent, he was not able to enter any type of plea. 
9- The Court incorrectly determined competency. 
10- The Court did not correctly follow the procedure to establish whether the Petitioner 
was competent when it did not hold a hearing or obtain evaluations from mental experts. 
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PER CURIAM: 
[^ jl] *1 Aaron L. Helbach appeals the denial 
of post-conviction relief from his conviction 
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. 
Helbach claims the post-conviction court 
erred by denying his claim that the district 
court should have sua sponte ordered a 
competency evaluation before accepting the 
plea. In the absence of a competency 
petition, " [a] trial court must hold a 
competency hearing when there is ' a 
substantial question of possible doubt as to a 
defendant's competency at the time of the 
guilty plea.' " Stale v. Arzaelles, 2003 UT 
1^ 49. 63 P.3d 731 (citation omitted). " In 
determining whether a defendant is 
competent to plead guilty, the trial court 
must consider whether the defendant has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his 
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding and has a rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him." State v. Holland 921 P.2d 
430.433 (Utah 1996). Thus, " [t]he fact that 
a person is mentally ill, displays bizarre, 
volatile, and irrational behavior, or has a 
history of mental illness, does not mean that 
he or she is incompetent to stand trial." 
Jacobs v State, 2001 UT 17^ 16. 20 P.3d 
382. In determining whether the trial court 
erred by not holding a competency hearing, 
a reviewing court considers the facts that 
were before the trial court when the plea was 
entered. See id. at 1[ 18. 
fl[2] Helbach had the burden to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a 
substantial question of possible doubt as to 
his competency existed at the time he 
pleaded guilty. He attached two exhibits to 
the post-conviction petition. The first was a 
military evaluation, prepared in 2001, and 
the second was a diagnostic evaluation, 
prepared on June 18, 2003, for use in 
sentencing in his criminal case. The military 
evaluation assessed Helbach's mental health, 
not his competency, and predated his guilty 
plea by two years. The diagnostic evaluation 
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also assessed mental health. not 
competency, and was prepared two months 
after the guilty plea. Nothing appearing in 
the district court record or at the change-of-
plea hearing would have created a 
substantial question of possible doubt about 
Helbach's competency. Helbach responded 
appropriately to the court's questions, 
affirmed his understanding of the written 
plea agreement, and acknowledged that he 
was knowingly and voluntarily pleading 
guilty. He advised his attorney of a possible 
additional charge, allowing counsel to obtain 
an agreement that the guilty plea could be 
withdrawn if the State filed the additional 
charge. Ihe post-conviction court correctly 
determined that the facts before the district 
court at the time of the change of plea did 
not give rise to a substantial question of 
possible doubt about Helbach's competency. 
fl[3] Helbach's claim that his guilty plea was 
taken in violation of rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure is inadequately 
briefed and without merit. A rule 11 
violation, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
support post-conviction relief, and a 
petitioner must demonstrate that his guilty 
plea w7as not knowing and voluntary. See 
Salazar v Warden, 852 P.2d 988. 992 (Utah 
1993). In advance of his guilty plea, 
Helbach executed a detailed statement, 
which stated the elements of the offense, the 
factual basis for the guilty plea, the possible 
sentences, the rights being waived, and the 
time limit for moving to withdraw a guilty 
plea. The district court conducted a plea 
colloquy and also confirmed that Helbach 
had read the statement and discussed it with 
counsel. The post-conviction court did not 
err in determining that Helbach's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and in 
denying relief based upon alleged rule 11 
violations. 
fl[4] *2 Helbach next claims that the post-
conviction court erred by denying relief 
based upon allegedly inappropriate police 
action resulting in a coerced confession and 
Miranda violations. A defendant who pleads 
guilty u is deemed to have admitted all of 
the essential elements of the crime charged 
and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional 
defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations." State v Parsons, 
781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); see also 
State v. Hardv, 2002 UT App 2445 13. 54 
P.3d 645. Having concluded that the post-
conviction court did not err in determining 
that Helbach's guilty plea was knowing and 
voluntary, we do not consider these claims 
further. 
[1*5] Helbach also claims that the post-
conviction court erred in denying relief 
based upon alleged ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel. To prevail, Helbach must 
demonstrate both that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient, cind that the 
deficient performance resulted in prejudice. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). Helbach contends that his trial 
counsel was ineffective by failing to move 
to withdraw the guilty plea based upon the 
evidence of mental illness contained in the 
2001 military evaluation or the 2003 
diagnostic evaluation prepared between the 
time of the plea hearing and sentencing. 
Neither evaluation addressed his 
competency to enter a guilty plea. The State 
correctly notes that the diagnostic report 
found no thought disorder or serious mental 
illness. Helbach did not present sufficient 
proof to the post-conviction court that his 
trial counsel was deficient in failing to move 
to withdraw the guilty plea, and that court 
did not err in denying relief. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d Page 3 
Not Reported in P.3d? 2007 WL 1576395 (Utah App.), 2007 UT App 191 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d) 
[%6] The remaining claims of ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel are both conclusory and 
inadequately briefed. Rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure'6 requires 
not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority." State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). An 
issue is inadequately briefed u when the 
overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and argument 
to the reviewing court." Id. We also reject 
Helbach's apparent challenge to rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Chil Procedure and his 
claim of u structural defect" as inadequately 
briefed. Accordingly, we do not consider 
these claims on the merits. 
[117] We affirm the denial of post-conviction 
relief. 
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Presiding Judge and 
CAROLYN B. McHUGH and WILLIAM 
A. THORNE JR., Judges, Concur. 
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United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-
Appellee, 
v. 
Ira Lee WILKINS, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 04-5189. 
Dec. 13,2005. 
Background: After defendant was indicted 
for conspiracy and access device fraud, he 
moved to suppress any statements obtained 
during interrogation on the grounds that he 
was not properly given his Miranda warn-
ings. After a hearing, The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Okla-
homa denied the motion, finding that 
Miranda warnings were given. Defendant 
then pled guilty, but appealed district court's 
denial of his motion to suppress. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Ebel, J.5 
held that defendant was precluded from rais-
ing arguments related to his statements made 
during interrogation because he had entered 
into unconditional guilty plea after he had 
made the statements. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Criminal Law 110 €^=> 1026.10(4) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(D) Right of Review 
110kl025 Right of Defendant to 
Review 
110kl026.10 Waiver or Loss 
of Right 
11 Old 026.10(2) Plea of 
Guilty or Nolo Contendere 
110kl026.10(4) k. Is-
sues Considered. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant was precluded from raising vari-
ous arguments challenging federal district 
court's denial of his motion to suppress his 
confessions, where defendant entered an un-
conditional plea of guilty, which precluded 
him from thereafter raising independent 
claims relating to the alleged deprivation of 
constitutional rights that occurred prior to 
entry of the guilty plea. 
*142 Usan K. Morgan, Philip E. Pinnell 
Asst. U.S. Attorney, Office of the United 
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States Attorney, Tulsa, OK. for Plaintiff-
Appellee. 
Ste\en M. Hightower, Tulsa, OK, for De-
fendant-Appellant. 
Before EBTL, McKAY and HFNRY, Cir-
cuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT^ 
FN* After examining the briefs and 
appellate record, this panel has de-
termined unanimously to grant the 
parties' request for a decision on the 
briefs without oral argument. See 
Fed. R.App. P. 34(f) amTlOth Cir. R. 
34.1(G). The case is therefore or-
dered submitted without oral argu-
ment. This Order and Judgment is 
not binding precedent, except under 
the doctrines of law of the case, res 
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The 
court generally disfavors the citation 
of orders and judgments; neverthe-
less, an order and judgment may be 
cited under the terms and conditions 
of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
DAVID M. EBEL, Circuit Judge. 
**1 Defendant-Appellant Ira Lee Wilkins 
appeals the district court's denial of his mo-
tion to suppress his confessions that he 
claims were given involuntarily and in Eola-
tion of his Fifth Amendment rights Exercis-
ing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we 
AFFIRM. 
BACKGROUND 
In early 2004, the United States Postal In-
spection Service launched an investigation 
into the tampering of a credit card account 
by a person later identified as Drukyel 
Gaines. Gaines changed the account infor-
mation to indicate that the cardholder wras a 
Lorenzo Gray of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Shortly 
after these changes were made, a person 
purporting to be Lorenzo Gray requested a 
duplicate card be issued and mailed to his 
address in Tulsa. This card was used to 
make over $13,000 worth of purchases; ad-
ditional cash advances in excess of $5,800 
were attempted but denied. 
When first interviewed by Postal Inspector 
Scott West, Gaines claimed that Lorenzo 
Gray was her boyfriend. She further stated 
that Gray was the person in a surveillance 
photograph taken of a black man wearing 
large diamond earrings and an 4OU Soon-
ers" baseball-st\le cap and using the 
Lorenzo Gray credit card. West later went to 
Gaines' residence to obtain a positive identi-
fication of Gray based on the photograph. 
When he arrived, Wilkins answered the 
door. West thought that Wilkins looked like 
the man in the photograph and noticed that 
Wilkins was wearing earrings that appeared 
to be identical to the ones worn in the pho-
tograph. West told Wilkins that he thought 
the picture was of him; Wilkins maintained 
it was a picture of Lorenzo Gray. 
On April 21, 2004. West (along with another 
postal inspector) went to Gaines' residence 
with a warrant for her arrest. After placing 
Gaines in custody, West discovered* 143 
Wilkins in the back bedroom. He also found 
an uOU Sooners" baseball cap that matched 
the hat in the surveillance photograph. The 
inspectors then took Wilkins back to the 
back bedroom, and questioned him about his 
involvement in the credit card scheme. The 
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parties dispute whether Wilkins was orally 
read and whether he orally waived his 
Miranda rights; !KJ both parties acknowledge 
Wilkins did not sign a written waiver. Wil-
kins eventually confessed, verbally and in 
writing, that he was the person in the sur-
veillance photos and that he had used the 
credit card. 
FN1. At the suppression hearing, 
West testified that Wilkins was read 
his Miranda rights, that Wilkins ac-
knowledged that he understood his 
rights, and that Wilkins nevertheless 
stated he would talk to the inspec-
tors. On the other hand, Wilkins tes-
tified that he was "absolutely not" 
read his Miranda rights. 
Wilkins was indicted for conspiracy and ac-
cess device fraud. He moved to suppress any 
statements obtained during the April 21 in-
terrogation on the grounds that he was not 
properly given his Miranda warnings. After 
a hearing, the district court denied the mo-
tion, finding that Miranda warnings were in 
fact given. The district court also noted that 
Wilkins might have been insinuating that 
there was some coercion involved in obtain-
ing his confession, but declined to rule on 
that issue. Wilkins then pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy and was sentenced to nine 
months in prison. 
DISCUSSION 
On appeal, Wilkins raises various arguments 
challenging the district court's denial of his 
motion to suppress his confessions. How-
ever, the record reflects that Wilkins entered 
an unconditional plea of guilty.— When a 
defendant voluntarily enters such a plea, "he 
may not thereafter raise independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional 
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the 
guilty plea." United States v. Salazar, 323 
F.3d 852, 856 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting 
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258. 267, 93 
S.Ct. 1602. 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973)). Be-
cause Wilkins' confessions occurred prior to 
his plea, he may not now argue that those 
confessions were taken unconstitutionally. 
Therefore, we must AFFIRM the district 
court's judgment. 
FN2. The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure allow a defendant to enter 
a "conditional" guilty plea, "reserv-
ing in writing the right to have an 
appellate court review an adverse de-
termination of a specified pretrial 
motion." Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). No 
such written document appears in the 
record, nor does the district court's 
docket sheet indicate the entry of a 
written, conditional plea. 
C.A.IO (Okla.).2005. 
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